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Rethinking Principles of Comparative. Fault in Light
of California's Proposition 51
I. INTRODUCTION
Apportionment of fault and damages between responsible plaintiffs
and defendants has recently been the topic of much debate. Legisla-
tures and courts alike have carved out new laws, overriding tradi-
tional common law decisions. The doctrine of joint and several
liability is currently being closely scrutinized and was the target of a
recent California Resolution. In 1986, California voters enacted Prop-
osition 51, appropriately dubbed "The Deep Pockets Initiative."'
1. Proposition 51 was codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431-1431.5 (West Supp. 1991).
Sections 1431.1 and 1431.2 are the operative sections and read as follows:
The People of the State of California find and declare as follows:
(a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as "the deep
pocket rule," has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has
threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies,
private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods
and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers.
(b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have sub-
stantial financial resources or insurance coverage and have thus been included
in lawsuits even though there was little or no basis for finding them at fault.
Under joint and several liability, if they are found to share even a fraction of
the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The Peo-
ple-taxpayes and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the
form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police,
fire and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insur-
ance premiums.
Therefore, the People of the State of California declare that to remedy
these inequities, defendants in tort actions shall be held financially liable in
closer proportion to their degree of fault. To treat them differently is unfair
and inequitable.
The People of the State of California further declare that reforms in the lia-
bility laws in tort actions are necessary and proper to avoid catastrophic eco-
nomic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as well as private
individuals and businesses.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1 (West Supp. 1991).
(a) In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for
non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each de-
fendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allo-
cated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of
fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for
that amount.
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, the term "economic damages" means ob-jectively verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earn-
1495
Proposition 51 retains joint and several liability for economic dam-
ages, but adopts only several liability, based on an equitable appor-
tionment of fault, for noneconomic damages. 2 The precise and full
effect of Proposition 51 is yet to be determined.3 The initiative was
found to be constitutional and nonretroactive by the Supreme Court
of California,4 but beyond that one can only speculate.
Although courts are limited by justiciability principles and thus
can only address cases or controversies, authors of law review articles
are not similarly constrained. Therefore, this Comment will act as an
advisory opinion detailing the applicability of Proposition 51 to a hy-
pothetical fact situation. The background of Proposition 51 will be
discussed, and a test will be developed to determine precisely when a
Proposition 51 analysis should be employed. Then, applying the
three-prong test developed by this author, the hypothetical fact situa-
tion will address whether a derivatively liable retailer5 is entitled to a
Proposition 51 apportionment in strict products liability stream of
commerce actions when the manufacturer of the defective product is
insolvent. The key issue to be determined is whether principles of
comparative fault apply in strict products liability chain of distribu-
ings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement, costs
of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment and loss of busi-
ness or employment opportunities.
(b)(2) For purposes of this section, the term "non-economic damages"
means subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suf-
fering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1991).
2. Id at § 1431.2(a).
3. One appellate court succinctly set forth its interpretation of what Proposition
51 intended to accomplish. See Green v. Franklin, 235 Cal. Rptr. 312, 321 (Cal. Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1987).
[Tihe very wording of Proposition 51 evidences a legislative wish to curtail
personal injury recoveries against defendants not primarily to blame for plain-
tiffs' injuries; to reduce the financial burden of injury claims on those defend-
ants and on their liability carriers; and to confer a financial benefit on the
public at large, who, the statute declares, 'ultimately pay for these lawsuits in
the form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums,' and
suffer a resulting reduction in essential government and nongovernment serv-
ices. The enactment seeks to accomplish these aims, very wisely we think, by
preventing a defendant from being liable for more than his proportionate
share of noneconomic damages.
Id.
The Green court addressed the general areas that the statute was enacted to cover;
this Comment will propose a three-prong test to be used to interpret the statute and
will apply the test to a specific issue that may or may not be encompassed by the
statute.
4. See infra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
5. The retailer's liability derives from his place in the chain of distribution of the
defective product produced by the manufacturer. The retailer acts merely as a conduit
connecting the manufacturer with the consumer. Therefore, the retailer's liability can
in some senses be classified as derivative. On the other hand, the retailer's liability is,
in some senses, direct. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
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tion actions. Furthermore, this Comment proposes a possible stan-
dard for apportioning fault/responsibility between retailers and
manufacturers. Finally, this Comment presents a review of the
methods by which other states have resolved the issue, and a brief
impact discussion follows.
II. BACKGROUND OF PROPOSITION 51
The perceived insurance crisis of the 1980s6 fueled a growing dis-
content with the doctrine of joint and several liability.7 The insur-
ance industry deemed joint and several liability as one of the primary
culprits responsible for the crisis.8 A vigorous and expensive cam-
paign was launched both in favor of and in opposition to Proposition
51 (The Fair Responsibility Act).9 The aim of Proposition 51 was to
abrogate joint and several liability for noneconomic damages10 and to
replace it with a system of several liability based upon on equitable
apportionment of fault." Joint and several liability was, however, to
be retained as to economic damages.12
Prior to Proposition 51, the burden of collecting from an insolvent
6. See generally Robert L. Habush, The Insurance "Crisis": Reality or Myth? A
Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Perspective, 64 DENy. U. L. REv. 641 (1988). The author claims
that the "crisis" was invented by the insurance companies to bolster an already strong
and healthy industry. I& at 648. Habush further asserts that any financial difficulties
the insurance industry may have is the direct result of portfolio mismanagement. Id
at 646. See also Jonathan L. Kirsch, Prop. 51 Shakes (barely) the House of Torts, 6
CAL. LAW. 69, 70 (June 1986) (according to the plaintiffs' bar, the crisis was manufac-
tured by the insurance industry. But according to the insurance industry, the crisis
was the result of rising litigation costs, the over-generosity of juries, and the propen-
sity of appellate courts to create new theories for liability for damages).
7. See generally Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Shieffler, Joint and Several Liability:
A Case for Reform, 64 DENV. U. L. REv. 651 (1988).
8. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, app. at 614 (Cal. 1988) (Argu-
ment in Favor of Proposition 51).
9. Both sides of the ballot fight raised more than ten million dollars to wage the
campaign. Approximately 4,543,000 voters turned out to vote--400,000 more than
voted in either the gubernatorial or U.S. Senate races. John Spano, Lawsuit Over
Death Pinpoints Confusion on Prop. 51 Timing, L.A. TIMEs, June 6,1986, at 1.
10. Non-economic damages are "subjective non-monetary losses including, but not
limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation."
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
11. Id. at § 1431.2(a).
12. Id. Economic damages include "objectively verifiable monetary losses includ-
ing medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of re-
pair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of
employment and loss of business or employment opportunities." Id. See also Evange-
latos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 590 (Cal. 1988).
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defendant was placed upon the solvent defendant through a cross-
complaint or subsequent action for equitable comparative indem-
nity.13 The jury would then apportion fault among all the parties in
the indemnity action according to relative culpability.14 Thus, the
practical effect of Proposition 51 was to shift the burden of collection
from the defendant to the plaintiff. No longer could the plaintiff sue
only the "deep pocket" defendant who was only fractionally responsi-
ble. Rather, the plaintiff would be forced to name all the potential
defendants in order to ensure a judgment for her entire damages.15
Proponents of Proposition 51 based their campaign on issues of
"fairness" and "dollars."16 They dubbed joint and several liability
the "deep pocket law," arguing that "[n]othing is more unfair than
forcing someone . . . to pay for damages that are someone else's
fault."17 They further pointed out that consumers ultimately bear
the burden of a judgment against a municipality or private enterprise
through higher taxes, higher insurance rates, and higher prices for
consumer goods.1S Proposition 51 proponents promised that liability
insurance would again be available to cities and counties; private sec-
tor insurance rates could drop ten to fifteen percent; and the "glut"
of unmeritorious lawsuits would be significantly reduced.19 Propo-
nents also portrayed trial lawyers associations as the greedy bad
13. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 590 (Cal. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Consider the following hypothetical situation: The plaintiff is injured and suf-
fers $10,000 in economic damage and $100,000 in noneconomic loss. At trial, the jury
finds that the plaintiff is 0% responsible, Defendant #1 is 10% responsible, and De-
fendant #2 is 90% responsible. Assume that Defendant #1 is wealthy and that De-
fendant #2 is insolvent.
Prior to Proposition 51, Plaintiff could sue only Defendant #1 and collect 100% of
both economic and non-economic damages, the full $110,000. Defendant #1 would
then be forced to cross-complain or later file a suit for indemnity against Defendant
#2. Because Defendant #2 is poor and possibly cannot provide full indemnity, De-
fendant #1 thus bears the burden/risk of Defendant #2's inability to pay.
After Proposition 51, if Plaintiff sued only Defendant #1, the plaintiff would re-
cover all of her economic damages, but only 10% of her non-economic damages,
($10,000 + $10,000 = $20,000). The burden/risk of Defendant #2's inability to pay
non-economic damages has thus shifted from Defendant #1 to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff will thus have an incentive to also name Defendant #2 in the lawsuit in order
to maximize the recovery.
16. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d app. at 614 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 51).
17. Id. See also James M. Galbraith, Deep-Pockets System: Welfare, Not Justice,
L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1986, at Metro 5 (Part 2).
18. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d app. at 614 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 51).
19. Id. Some commentators, however, believe that the elimination of joint and
several liability will actually result in an increase in insurance rates and transaction
costs. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims'Rights, 22
GONZ. L. REV. 15, 16 n.8 (1986); Philip A. Talmadge and N. Clifford Petersen, In
Search of a Proper Balance, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 259, 264-65 (1986). Other commentators
believe that predictability is absolutely essential to the control of insurance costs and
the minimization of risk. See Basil L. Badley, Why Tort Reform Was Needed in Wash-
ington, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 3, 11-12 (1986).
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guys2 0 and provided a long and diverse list of supporters of the
initiative.2 1
On the other hand, opponents of Proposition 51 also claimed to
promote principles of fairness and economic efficiency.22 They por-
trayed the initiative as a fraud perpetrated by the insurance and toxic
waste companies in order to shirk responsibilities and increase earn-
ings at the expense of innocent tort victims.23 Opponents also ac-
cused local governments of not doing what the taxpayers elected
them to do: "[protect] the people by maintaining efficient police and
fire services and safe roads."24 They further claimed that fairness de-
manded that the burden of the economic shortfall caused by an insol-
vent party fall on the guilty (tortious) parties and not the innocent
victims. 25 Opponents also argued that the initiative would remove "a
crucial incentive for companies and local governments to protect the
public from injury accidents."28
The voters were, in essence, asked to make a priority judgment.
On the one hand, they were asked to consider the interests of an
often innocent2 7 plaintiff in fully recovering both economic and non-
economic damages,28 even if it meant an increase in taxes, insurance
premiums, and, prices of consumer goods.2 9 On the other hand, the
voters were asked to weigh the interests of individuals and entities,
20. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d app. at 614-15 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 51).
21. Id. at 616 (Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 51). Included in the list
of supporters were: County Supervisors Association of California, League of California
Cities, California Taxpayers' Association, California State PTA, California Chamber of
Commerce, California Peace Officers Association, Consumer Alert, California Medical
Association, California District Attorneys Association, California Defense Counsel, As-
sociation for California Tort Reform, California Hospital Association, Association of
California School Administrators, all 58 counties, and virtually every city in California.
Id&
22. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d app. at 615 (Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposi-
tion 51). Opponents to Proposition 51 argued that welfare rolls would increase as the
number of persons confined to wheelchairs and respirators increased. Consumer advo-
cate Ralph Nader echoed their sentiments when he declared, "The insurance industry
is using its current massive premium gouging and arbitrary cancellations as a political
battering ram to further bloat profits." Id
23. Id,
24. Id
25. See Evangelatos, 753 P.2d app. at 615 (Argument Against Proposition 51).
26. Myrna Oliver, Prop. 51 Foes Say It Will Also Cut Sofety Incentives, L.A.
TIMES, April 29, 1986, at Metro 1.
27. The plaintiff does not have to be completely innocent. Under Li v. Yellow
Cab, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975), the plaintiff can still recover even if comparatively neg-
ligent. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
28. See supra notes 10, 12 and accompanying text.
29. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(a).
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both public and private, in having to pay only their proportional
share of the noneconomic damages, even if it meant that a plaintiff
would not be made legally whole.30 The California voters balanced
these interests in favor of the latter, adopting Proposition 51 with a
sixty-four percent approval rate on June 3, 1986.31 Litigation con-
cerning the proposition's constitutionality and retroactivity soon
followed.32
Evangelatos v. Superior Court
The constitutionality and retroactivity questions were answered by
the California Supreme Court in Evangelatos v. Superior Court. 33 In
Evangelatos, the plaintiff was seriously injured while attempting to
make homemade fireworks with chemicals bought at a retail store.34
The plaintiff subsequently filed an action against the retailer, the
wholesaler, and four manufacturers of the chemicals under theories
of negligence and strict liability.35 Five years after the accident and
three weeks after the approval of Proposition 51, the case was as-
signed for trial.36 The plaintiff contended that Proposition 51 was
unconstitutional and should not apply retroactively to cases accruing
prior to its effective date.37 The trial court disagreed on both points,
concluding that Proposition 51 was both constitutional and that it ap-
plied retroactively to all cases that came to trial after its effective
date.38 The court of appeal, disagreeing with a previous appellate
court decision as to the initiative's retroactivity,39 affirmed the trial
court's rulings on both issues.4° The California Supreme Court
granted review in order to resolve the conflict in the appellate
courts41 and subsequently upheld the trial court's ruling that Propo-
sition 51 was constitutional.42 However, the court overruled the trial
30. "Legally whole" is a term of art meaning that the plaintiff is theoretically
placed in the same position she would have been in had the injury not occurred.
31. Consumerists Hit Limit On Damages, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1986, at C35. For a
critical and historical analysis of voter initiatives, see Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy
Lawmaking: Questions the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initia-
tive, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 733 (1988).
32. See, e.g., Russell v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Russell was the first case to reach the appellate level.
33. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
34. Id.
35. Id. The suit against the four manufacturers was dismissed prior to trial.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 586-87.
38. Id. at 587.
39. The court in Russell v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988),
had previously concluded that Proposition 51 did not apply retroactively to causes of
action arising prior to the initiative's effective date. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 587.
40. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 587.
41. IdL
42. Id. at 595.
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court's finding of retroactivity.43
As to the issue of constitutionality, the plaintiff first contended
that the initiative was "'too vague and ambiguous' to satisfy the due
process requirements of either the state or federal Constitutions."44
The court rebutted the due process claim by asserting that most stat-
utes are to some extent ambiguous, but should not necessarily be in-
validated "[so] long as a statute does not threaten to infringe on the
exercise of Fhst Amendment or other constitutional rights."45 The
court then pointed out that in order to overturn a statute on vague-
ness grounds, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the statute is " 'im-
permissibly vague in all of its applications.' "46 Therefore, because
the plaintiff was not able to satisfy this burden of proof,47 the court
determined that his due process complaint was without merit.48
Arguing in the alternative, the plaintiff contended that Proposition
51 was unconstitutional because it violated state and federal equal
protection clauses "by establishing classifications that are not ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest."49 In particular, the plain-
tiff claimed that the initiative discriminated between injured persons
who suffered economic harm and those who suffered only
noneconomic harm, thereby affording more protection to the former
group.50 Plaintiff further claimed that the statute discriminated
among those who suffered only noneconomic harm, differentiating
between those who are injured by solvent tortfeasors and those who
are injured by insolvent tortfeasors, once again providing more pro-
tection to the former category of plaintiffs.51
The court disagreed, likening the plaintiff's argument to an earlier
challenge of a provision of MICRA,52 where the court determined
43. Id at 611.
44. Id, at 592. Plaintiff relied on the classic statement of the vagueness doctrine
set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Connally v. General Construc-
tion Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). The Court declared that "a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process law." Id. at 391.
45. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 592.
46. Id at 592-93 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982))
(emphasis added).
47. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 593.
48. Id.
49. Id at 592.
50. Id at 593-94.
51. Id at 594.
52. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985). The Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) placed a limit on noneconomic
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that there was "clearly a rational basis for distinguishing between
economic and non-economic losses."53 The court also pointed out
that under any tort liability system, a plaintiff who is injured by a
solvent tortfeasor will be better off than one injured by an insolvent
tortfeasor and that such consequences have never been held to
render the tort statutes unconstitutional. 54 Thus, the California
Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 51 was not unconstitutional.55
Next, the court addressed the plaintiff's contention that even if the
statute was constitutional, it should not apply retroactively to causes
of action that accrued prior to the effective date of the initiative.s6
The court declared that in determining the retroactivity of a statute,
a general principle57 must be followed: "'[lit is an established canon
damages which could be recovered in medical malpractice actions, but placed no simi-
lar restraints on the recovery of economic damages. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West
1991).
53. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 594 n.10. The text of footnote 10 reads as follows:
In Fein, the court pointed out that legal commentators had long questioned
whether sound public policy supported the comparable treatment of economic
and noneconomic damages explaining that "[t]houghtful jurists and legal
scholars have for some time raised serious questions as to the wisdom of
awarding damages for pain and suffering in any negligence case, noting, inter
alia, the inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on such losses, the
fact that money damages are at best only imperfect compensation for such in-
tangible injuries and that such damages are generally passed on to, and borne
by, innocent consumers. While the general propriety of such damages is, of
course, firmly embedded in our common law jurisprudence (citation], no Cali-
fornia case of which we are aware has ever suggested that the right to recover
for such noneconomic injuries is constitutionally immune from legislative lim-
itation or revision."
Id at 595.
54. Id at 595.
55. Id
56. Id. The effective date of Proposition 51 was June 4, 1986. Id at 587 n.2. Nu-
merous amicus briefs asserted that there was no reason to consider the retroactivity
issue because causes of action which accrued prior to the initiative's effective date but
did not come to trial until after the effective date, would constitute only prospective
and not retroactive application. Id at 595. The court disagreed, citing the leading Cali-
fornia decision on the subject, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n., 182 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1947), where injured parties contended that a new work-
ers' compensation statute should apply to awards after the effective date, even though
the injuries had occurred prior to the enactment date. The Evangelatos court also
cited the United States Supreme Court to confirm that applying a statute to causes of
action which arose prior to the effective date of the statute, even if tried after the ef-
fective date, constitutes a retroactive application. See Winfree v. Northern Pac. Ry.
Co., 227 U.S. 296 (1913).
57. The court relied on the language of an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist to succinctly set forth the general principles governing the issue of whether a
statute should be applied retroactively or prospectively. Evangelatos, 753 P.2d at 596.
Rehnquist explained:
"The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial deci-
sions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student. This court has
often pointed out: '[T]he first rule of construction is that legislation must be
considered as addressed to the future, not the past .... The rule has been
expressed in varying degrees of strength but always of one import, that a ret-
rospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with ante-
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of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective op-
eration unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legisla-
tive intent.' "58 Applying the previously mentioned general principle
to Proposition 51, the court decided that a fair reading of the whole
statute revealed that the subject of retroactivity was simply not ad-
dressed.59 Therefore, because the presumption of prospectivity was
not overcome, the court concluded that prospective application was
required.60 Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals was af-
firmed as to the constitutionality but reversed as to retroactivity.6 1
The question left unresolved by the California Supreme Court is:
What types of actions are governed by the provisions of Proposition
51?
III. A PROPOSED TEST
At the time of this Comment's publication, no California court has
yet enunciated a test to determine whether an action is governed by
Proposition 51.62 Both the language of the statute and its intended
purpose suggest that a three-prong test is appropriate. The first
prong of the proposed test asks whether the action is one that would
be encompassed under the common law doctrine of joint and several
liability.63 The second prong requires a determination as to whether
the action is one for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful
cedent rights ... unless such be 'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the
terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature.'"
Id at 596 (quoting United States v. Security Ind. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1982)) (cita-
tions omitted).
58. Id at 597 (quoting Aetna, 182 P.2d at 166). The court also pointed out that the
California Civil Code section 3 states that "'[n]o part of [this code] is retroactive unless
expressly so declared.'" Id at 597 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 3 (West 1991)).
59. Id at 598.
60. Id at 605.
61. Id at 611.
62. That is to say that neither California appellate courts nor or the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreting California law have decided this issue.
63. The basis of this first prong comes from what seems to be the purpose state-
ment of the statute:
(a) The legal doctrine of joint and several liability, also known as the 'deep
pocket rule,' has resulted in a system of inequity and injustice that has
threatened financial bankruptcy of local governments, other public agencies,
private individuals and businesses and has resulted in higher prices for goods
and services to the public and in higher taxes to the taxpayers.
CAL. CIV. CODE § :1431.1(a) (West 1991). If the action is not under the doctrine of joint
and several liability at common law, then the statute's purpose would not apply to that
particular action. Therefore, neither should the language of the statute apply. For the
full text of the operative portion of the statute, see supra note 1.
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death based on principles of comparative fault.64 The third prong
examines whether the application of Proposition 51 would fulfill the
policy concerns undergirding its adoption.65 Each of the three prongs
would have to be satisfied in order to entitle the defendant to appor-
tionment under Proposition 51.66
A. Hypothetical Case
In order to illustrate the application of this three-prong analysis, a
borderline hypothetical fact situation will serve as a test case. As-
sume that a manufacturer produces a product which is later deter-
mined to be defective under California law.67 The defective product
is distributed through ordinary channels and sold by a retailer. As-
sume also that the retailer could not have discovered the defect even
after making a diligent inspection and was not in any way negligent.
A consumer purchases the product and subsequently is personally in-
jured by the product and sues both the manufacturer and the retailer
under strict products liability. Assume that the consumer used the
product properly and did not assume any risks or act negligently in
any way. At the time of trial the manufacturer is found to be insol-
vent, thus the retailer is the sole defendant. Further assume that the
retailer will be able to satisfy the judgment entered against it, and
that the plaintiff is not wealthy. The issue then becomes: Is the re-
tailer entitled to an apportionment of fault under Proposition 51, or
must the retailer bear the full financial burden of the plaintiff's
damages? The following is an application of the proposed three-
prong test to the hypothetical scenario outlined above.
64. The basis for the second prong derives from what seems to be the parameters
of application set by the statute: "(a) In any action for personal injury, property dam-
age, or wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative. fault, the liability of each
defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(a) (West 1991). For the full text of the operative portion of
the statute, see supra note 1.
65. The basis for the third prong is the perceived problems underlying the purpose
statement:
(b) Some governmental and private defendants are perceived to have sub-
stantial financial resources or insurance coverage and have thus been included
in lawsuits even though there was little or no basis for finding them at fault.
Under joint and several liability, if they are found to share even a fraction of
the fault, they often are held financially liable for all the damage. The Peo-
ple-taxpayers and consumers alike-ultimately pay for these lawsuits in the
form of higher taxes, higher prices and higher insurance premiums.
(c) Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police,
fire and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insur-
ance premiums.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 1431.1(b)-(c) (West 1991). For the full text of the operative portion
of the statute, see supra note 1.
66. Note that it is the defendant rather than the plaintiff who seeks an apportion-
ment in order to reduce his share of the plaintiff's noneconomic damages.
67. For a discussion of what constitutes a defective product under California law,
see B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 1247-49 (9th ed. 1988).
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B. Joint and Several Liability
In order to satisfy the first prong of the proposed Proposition 51
test, a defendant must be found jointly and severally liable for plain-
tiff's damages using common law analysis. The doctrine of joint and
several liability operates on the principle that each individual
tortfeasor is personally liable for any indivisible injuries of which his
wrongdoing is a proximate cause.68 Courts also apply joint and sev-
eral liability in situations under which a preexisting relationship be-
tween two entities calls for holding one entity liable for the acts of
the other.69
Under joint and several liability, a joint judgment is entered
against all of the tortfeasors, regardless of their respective degrees of
fault. The plaintiff may then collect his judgment from whichever
defendant or combination of defendants he chooses. As a result, the
defendants are left to determine among themselves whether liability
will be reapportioned pro rata or according to fault.70 The defendant
with the deepest pocket may be the only one sued by the plaintiff
and must cross-complain7l or subsequently file an action for indem-
nity or contribution against the other responsible tortfeasors.72 If the
other tortfeasors are for some reason unable to pay, the deep pocket
defendant may end up bearing more than his proportionate share of
the financial burden of the entire judgment. Therefore, theoretically,
a defendant who was only one percent responsible for plaintiff's inju-
ries could wind up having to pay 100 percent of the damages. 73
1. Analysis
Applying the facts of our hypothetical test case, the issue becomes
whether a retailer is jointly and severally liable with the manufac-
turer of a defective product using common law analysis.74 In Kamin-
68. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 575 P.2d 899, 904 (Cal. 1978)
[hereinafter AMA]; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 47, 52 (5th ed. 1984).
69. AMA, 575 P.2d at 904.
70. See generally Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 652.
71. This is the California equivalent of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 14(b)
Impleader.
72. See generally Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 633 (Cal. 1988).
73. Such a case actually occurred in Florida. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood,
515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987); see also Andrew Blum, The '1 Percent Case': Yes, It Exists,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1987.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text setting forth the test.
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ski v. Western MacArthur Co.,75 a California appellate court
conclusively stated that "[i]n products liability cases, a consumer in-
jured by a defective product may sue any business entity in the chain
of production and marketing, from the original manufacturer down
through the distributor and wholesaler to the retailer; liability of all
such defendants is joint and several."76 Four principal policy con-
cerns are used to rationalize the imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity on entities in the stream of commerce. 77 The following are the
policy reasons stated by the California courts and a brief application
of those policies to the hypothetical case.78
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company,79 the California Supreme
Court set forth its policy reasons in order to rationalize joint and sev-
eral liability in the chain of distribution.80 The first rationale is a
sort of moral fault or implied responsibility.8 Retailers, so the argu-
ment goes, are a key part of the overall producing and marketing en-
terprises and are, thus, somewhat responsible for the injuries
resulting from defective products.8 2 Therefore, even though retailers
may not be directly at fault, responsibility is imputed to them based
on their role in the stream of commerce.
In the hypothetical case, the innocent consumer was not in any
way morally blameworthy for his injuries. Yet, neither was the re-
tailer because the defect in the product was undiscoverable. How-
ever, strict liability imputes fault or implies responsibility on the
retailer because the retailer is an integral part of the overall enter-
prise and thus should bear the resulting costs. Therefore, in order to
satisfy the underlying policy concerns of joint and several liability,
the retailer is held responsible and forced to compensate the injured
plaintiff.
The second policy justification for joint and several liability in the
stream of commerce is the concern for compensating the injured, and
often innocent, plaintiff.8 3 Many times a plaintiff is injured by a de-
75. 220 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
76. 1d. at 901 (emphasis in original). See also Becker v. IRM, 691 P.2d 166 (Cal.
1985); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich
Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (strict liability applied to wholesale-
retail distributor).
77. Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 669-70.
78. The application of the stated policies to the hypothetical fact situation should
in no way imply that unless each and every policy concern is met, joint and several
liability should not apply. Rather, this is done for illustrative purposes only.
79. 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
80. Id. at 171-72.
81. Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 669.
82. Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171. See also Angelus Assoc. Corp. v. Neonex Lei-
sure Prods., Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). "[Plublic policy demands
[retailers] respond in damages to the injured consumer although they may be 'factually
innocent' of any wrongdoing." Id,
83. Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 669.
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fective product manufactured by a subsequently insolvent entity.
Thus, the retailer may then be the only member of the chain of dis-
tribution available to compensate the plaintiff.84 The Kaminski
court explained that "[b]y extending liability to entities farther down
the commercial stream than the manufacturer, the policy of compen-
sating the injured plaintiff is preserved."8 5 Therefore, the interest in
making the plaintiff "whole" is deemed to justify placing the finan-
cial burden of the injury on the retailer.
In the hypothetical case, the plaintiff is an innocent purchaser of a
product manufactured by a now insolvent entity. The retailer is the
only entity down the commercial stream capable of responding in
damages. Therefore, the policy of compensating injured plaintiffs is
preserved only if the retailer is forced to compensate the injured
plaintiff.
The third policy reason underlying the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability in the chain of commerce is the concept of loss distribu-
tion.8 6  The retailer shares in the profit from the production,
distribution, and sale of the products and should, therefore, share in
the losses associated with participating in the enterprise.8 7 Retailers
are "an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enter-
prises that should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective
products."88
Applying this rationale to the facts of the hypothetical case, the re-
tailer should be forced to compensate the plaintiff. The retailer,
through its dealings with the manufacturer, directly benefits finan-
cially from the sale of the product to the consumer, thereby sharing
in the profits generated from production and distribution of the prod-
uct. Losses normally associated with participating in the enterprise
surely include civil suits arising out of injuries caused by defective
84. Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171.
85. Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985). See also Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725 (Cal. 1970) (imposing strict lia-
bility on the lessor of chattels). The purpose of strict liability "'is to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless
to protect themselves.' Id. (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d
897, 901 (Cal. 1963)).
86. Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 669.
87. Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171.
88. 1i See also Price, 466 P.2d at 725-26. "[T]he paramount policy to be promoted
by the rule is... the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating them."
I&
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products. Therefore, the policy of profit and loss sharing is fulfilled
by making the retailer compensate the plaintiff for his injuries.
The fourth justification cited for applying joint and several liability
is the defendant's ability to pay.8 9 The retailer is thought to be in a
better position to insure against losses caused by defective products
than is the consumer plaintiff.90 Joint and several liability places the
burden on those "better capable of estimating and spreading the risk
of the marketing of defective products."
91
The retailer in the hypothetical case engages in many similar
transactions and is thus capable of estimating the associated risks.
The retailer is also able to slightly increase prices to all consumers,
thus spreading the risk, in order to pay for the increased insurance
against such risks. The consumer, though, is a one-time purchaser
virtually unaware or unable to calculate the risk, let alone spread the
risk. Therefore, it is much more efficient for one retailer to insure
against injuries than to place this burden on many individual
consumers.
The first prong of the proposed Proposition 51 test requires a show-
ing that the action is one in which the defendants are jointly and sev-
erally liable at common law. California case law explicitly states that
retailers and manufacturers are jointly and severally liable for defec-
tive products placed in the stream of commerce. Further, the policy
concerns underlying joint and several liability are fulfilled by apply-
ing the doctrine to stream of commerce cases. Therefore, the first
prong of the test is satisfied in the hypothetical case.
C. Historical Background of Comparative Fault
In order to satisfy the second prong of the proposed Proposition 51
test, the underlying action must be one for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death based on principles of comparative fault.
While deciding whether the claim is one for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death is fairly straightforward, the determina-
tion of whether the action is based on principles of comparative fault
is considerably more challenging.
Apportionment of fault between plaintiffs and defendants or
among defendants alone was virtually nonexistent at common law.92
The legal principle of contributory negligence controlled negligence
causes of action, and the doctrine of strict products liability was not
89. Pressler and Shieffler, supra note 7, at 669.
90. Kaminski v. Western MacArthur Co., 220 Cal. Rptr. 895, 901 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985).
91. Id
92. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585, 689 (Cal. 1988).
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yet born. 93 Under the rigid rule of contributory negligence, a plain-
tiff who was found to be responsible in any way for her own injuries
was barred from recovering any damages.94 Reflecting the mounting
dissatisfaction with contributory negligence,95  the California
Supreme Court retreated from that harsh rule in 1975 in Li v. Yellow
Cab.96 The following traces the evolution of the principles of compar-
ative fault in California.
1. Li v. Yellow Cab
In Li, the plaintiff (driver) made an unsafe left turn and was
struck by the defendant's car, which was traveling at an unsafe
speed.97 The trial court analyzed the case under the then-existing
rule of contributory negligence, thereby barring the plaintiff's
claim.98 Reasoning that contributory negligence was inequitable be-
cause it failed to "distribute responsibility in proportion to fault,"99
the California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal expressly adopt-
ing the "pure" form of comparative negligence.' 00
The court proceeded through a lengthy analysis of the California
Civil Code in order to determine if it had the power to adopt the new
standard.lo' The majority finally concluded that, by its own terms,l0 2
the code was to be liberally construed to promote justice. 03 In keep-
ing with its view of liberal construction, the court granted to trial
judges "broad discretion in seeking to assure that the principle stated
is applied in the interest of justice and in furtherance of the purposes
and objectives set forth in this opinion."'1 4 The court expressed mild
93. Strict Products Liability was officially adopted in California in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1978).
94. KEETON, supra note 68, § 67 at 433.
95. Id.
96. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
97. Id. at 1229.
98. Id. at 1230.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1242. The "pure" form of comparative negligence "apportions liability in
direct proportion to fault in all cases." Id.
101. Id. at 1232-38. The court repeatedly cites Professor Arvo Van Alstyne's article
for support. See Introductory Commentary to West's Annotated Civil Code, CAL. Civ.
CODE (West 1954).
102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (West 1988).
103. Li, 532 P.24i at 1239. The court declared: "[W]e conclude that the rule of lib-
eral construction made applicable to the code by its own terms ... together with the
code's peculiar character as a continuation of the common law... permit if not require
that section 1714 be interpreted so as to give dynamic expression to the fundamental
precepts which it summarizes." Id.
104. Id. at 1243-44.
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concern for the ability of the jury to adequately apportion negligence
between the parties, then summarily dismissed its worries, relying on
the success that other jurisdictions had enjoyed under the system. 0 5
The court expressly refused to decide whether the principle of com-
parative negligence should be applied to cases involving multiple de-
fendants,' 06 and confined its holding to negligence cases.107
2. American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court
Three years later in 1978, the court was faced with the decision of
whether to apply the principles annunciated in Li to multiple defend-
ant cases in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.08
In American Motorcycle Association (hereinafter AMA), a teenage
boy was seriously injured in an AMA-sponsored race.10 9 AMA and
Viking Motorcycle Club were named as defendants and sued for neg-
ligence.110 AMA sought to cross-complain against the plaintiff's par-
ents, seeking indemnity from them if AMA was found to be liable."'
In the alternative, AMA argued that the doctrine of joint and several
liability was abolished by Li and sought declaratory relief allocating a
portion of the negligence to the plaintiff's parents.112 However, the
trial court refused to allow AMA to cross-complain against the plain-
tiff's parents, and thus, AMA appealed."13
Once before the California Supreme Court, AMA argued that the
concept of joint and several liability was totally incompatible with a
system of comparative negligence because it undermined the ration-
105. Id. at 1232.
106. Id. at 1241. This issue was later decided in AMA. See infra notes 108-126 and
accompanying text.
107. Li, 532 P.2d at 1243. Comparative negligence principles were later expanded to
strict liability in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978). See infra
notes 127-142 and accompanying text.
108. 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978).
109. Id. at 902. Plaintiff's injuries allegedly included a crushing of his spine, which
resulted in permanent loss of the use of his legs and permanent inability to perform
sexual functions. Id at 903.
110. Id at 902. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants negligently designed,
managed, supervised, and administered the race, as well as negligently solicited en-
trants. Id.
111. Id. at 903. This was done because the plaintiff did not name his parents as de-
fendants in his complaint. AMA claimed that the plaintiff's parents negligently failed
to supervise their child and that this failure constituted active negligence on their part.
Furthermore, AMA claimed that its negligence, if any, was only passive and, therefore,
AMA was entitled to be indemnified by the plaintiff's parents. Id
112. Id
113. Id. at 903. AMA sought a writ of mandate from the court of appeal to force
the trial court to grant AMA leave to file its cross-complaint. The court of appeal rec-
ognized the need for a quick resolution and the recurrent nature of the issue and ac-
cordingly issued an alternative writ. The court ultimately granted a peremptory writ
of mandate. The supreme court, because of the importance of the case, then ordered a
hearing on Its own motion. Id
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ale for joint and several liability.114 The court, however, disagreed,
asserting that the ability to apportion fault on a comparative negli-
gence basis does not render an otherwise indivisible jury divisible for
purposes of joint and several liability.115 The court further explained
that the policy concerns behind joint and several liability would be
subserved by its abrogation, stating, "The fact that one of the
tortfeasors is impecunious or otherwise immune from suit does not
relieve another tortfeasor of his liability for damage which he him-
self has proximately caused."116 The court was concerned that a
completely innocent plaintiff rather than a blameworthy defendant
would end up bearing the financial shortfall left by an absent co-des
fendant.117 The court therefore concluded that Li had not abolished
the common law doctrine of joint and several liability"S and that a
concurrent tortfeasor's liability could be reduced only in proportion
to the amount attributable to the plaintiff.119
As to AMA's indemnity plea, the court was more sympathetic. Af-
ter careful reexamination of the common law doctrine of equitable
indemnity in light of Li, the court concluded that partial indemnifica-
tion among concurrent tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis
should be allowed.12 o The court briefly traced the historical differ-
ences between contribution and indemnity, ultimately concluding
that the difference between the two concepts is "more formalistic
than substantive."121 At the time of the development of the equita-
ble indemnity doctrine, no concept of comparative negligence existed,
thus equitable indemnity became an all or nothing proposition, simi-
lar to contributory negligence.122 Because equitable indemnity suf-
fered from the same infirmity as contributory negligence, the court
114. Id. at 905. In support of this proposition AMA cited Finnegan v. Royal Realty
Co., 218 P.2d at 17, 32 (Cal. 1950).
115. AMA, 578 P.2d at 905.
116. Id at 904.
117. Id at 905. 'I'his, however, is precisely what Proposition 51 was later enacted to
accomplish. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 1.
118. AMA, 578 P.2d at 906-07. The court pointed out that joint and several liability
was retained under comparative negligence in all states that had decided the issue. Id
(citing SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.4, at 253 (1974)).
119. Id at 906-07. See also Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975).
120. AMA, 578 P.2d at 912. The court again justified its decision by pointing out
that other jurisdictions had successfully adopted similar rules. Id at 913.
121. Id at 907. "As Judge Learned Hand observed more than a quarter century
ago: '[I]ndemnity is only an extreme form of contribution.'" Id, at 907 n.3 (quoting
Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951)).
122. Id. at 908-09.
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determined that it too required modification.123 The court concluded
that the fairness principles established in Li mandated a "system
under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negli-
gence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault."'124
Therefore, the court determined that a defendant may file a cross-
complaint against a co-tortfeasor for indemnity even when such
tortfeasor was not named by the plaintiff in the original action.'m
Accordingly, AMA was allowed to file its cross-complaint against the
plaintiff's parents for equitable indemnity.126
3. Daly v. General Motors Corp.
That same year, the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General
Motors Corp. contemplated whether to extend the principles of com-
parative negligence set forth in Li to strict products liability cases.12
Some fifteen years earlier in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.,128 the court had sanctioned the new doctrine of strict products
liability. 29 This doctrine, however, did not include any basis for ap-
portionment of fault among the parties, and contributory negligence
was not a defense.'3 0
Numerous amicus briefs were submitted on both sides of the issue
of whether to further extend principles of comparative fault.131
Those who opposed the expansion of comparative negligence into
comparative fault vigorously argued that comparing a plaintiff's neg-
ligence with a defendant's strict liability was like comparing "apples
and oranges" or mixing "oil and water."' 3 2 The majority of the court,
while "fully recognizing the theoretical and semantic distinctions be-
tween the twin principles of strict products liability and traditional
negligence," thought that the two concepts could be "blended or ac-
123. Id, at 912.
124. Id,
125. Id, at 917. "[We think it only fair that a defendant who may be jointly and
severally liable for all of the plaintiff's damages be permitted to bring other
tortfeasors into the suit." Id. The court further concluded that the interaction of par-
tial indemnity with California's cross-complaint procedures would not unduly preju-
dice plaintiffs. Id.
126. Id. at 918.
127. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
128. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1978).
129. See infra notes 223-49 and accompanying text for further discussion of the de-
velopment of strict products liability.
130. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1166. Assumption of the risk was, however, a complete de-
fense. I& See also Luque v. McLean, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Cal. 1972); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A, cmt. b (1977).
131. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1164.
132. Id. at 1167. Opponents argued that since contributory negligence is only a de-
fense to negligence, and comparative negligence only affects contributory negligence,
then comparative negligence cannot be a defense to strict liability. Id.
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commodated."' 133 The court criticized the rigidity of the "apples and
oranges" distinction,I34 pointing out that in order to achieve substan-
tial justice, some interweaving of the two concepts was necessary.135
The court also noted that the whole concept of strict products liabil-
ity resulted from dissatisfaction with the "wooden formalisms of
traditional tort and contract principles."136 The court further as-
serted that neither the existing comparative negligence, nor the for-
mer contributory negligence standards rendered exact measures.137
The court finally concluded that "[flixed semantic onsistency ... is
less important than the attainment of a just and equitable result."'l3
Further, the court summarily dismissed the objection that juries
would be incapable of measuring and comparing the negligence of the
plaintiff with the strict liability of the defendant.139 The court noted
that while the term "equitable apportionment of loss" is a more accu-
rate and descriptive term, "comparative fault" was in such wide use
that it should be adopted by the court.140 Finally, reaffirming the
wisdom of Li, the court granted broad discretion to trial courts when
applying its holding141 and extended such discretion to the imple-
mentation of comparative fault principles in strict products liability
cases.142
4. Sqfeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart
The California Supreme Court again expanded tort reform in 1978
by taking principles of comparative fault one step further in Safeway
133. Id. Contra Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986 (en
banc)) (holding that principles of comparative fault do not apply to strict products lia-
bility cases).
134. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1167-68.
135. Id. at 1167.
136. Id.
137. I& at 1168.
138. I& The court further concluded:
[i]n this evolving area of tort law in which new remedies are judicially cre-
ated, and old defenses judicially merged, impelled by strong considerations of
equity and firness we seek a larger synthesis. If a more just result follows
from the expansion of comparative principles, we have no hesitancy in seek-
ing it, mindful always that the fundamental and underlying purpose of Li was
to promote the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally responsi-
ble in proportion to their fault.
Id at 1169.
139. Id, at 1170. "We are... convinced that jurors are able to undertake a fair ap-
portionment of liability." Id. See also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
140. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1172.
141. See supro. notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
142. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1172.
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Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart.143 In Sqfeway, the plaintiff was injured
when a supermarket shopping cart collapsed.144 The plaintiff
brought suit against the owner of the cart, Safeway, and the manu-
facturer, Nest-Kart, alleging that the defendants were liable for her
injuries under both negligence and strict liability theories.145 Follow-
ing Li, which allowed for broad discretion when applying its princi-
ples,146 the trial court instructed the jury to determine whether and
under which theories each defendant was liable, and to apportion the
relative fault attributable to each defendant.147 The jury ultimately
concluded that Safeway was liable under both negligence and strict
products liability theories, and that Nest-Kart was liable only under
strict products liability.148 The jury further found that Safeway's
comparative fault was eighty percent, and that Nest-Kart's compara-
tive fault was twenty percent. 149 Upon a motion by Safeway,150 the
trial court indicated that common sense suggested apportionment on
a comparative fault basis was proper, but held that statutory law
called for a pro rata apportionment.' 5 ' However, on appeal, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court sanctioned apportionment of fault between a
strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant. 152
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed the wisdom of its deci-
sion in AMA, stating that existing contribution statutes "do not in
themselves necessarily prohibit apportionment of liability among
multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis."'1 3 Thus, the nar-
row issue before the court was whether apportionment on a compara-
tive fault basis was proper when one or more of the defendants'
liability derives from principles of strict liability.154 The court an-
swered in the affirmative for three reasons. First, the court believed
that the basic equitable considerations undergirding the adoption of
comparative fault applied equally to the present case. The court de-
clared, "Nothing in the rationale of strict products liability conflicts
with a rule which apportions liability between a strictly liable de-
143. 579 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1978).
144. ML at 442.
145. a
146. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
147. Sqfeway, 579 P.2d at 442.
148. IaL
149. Id.
150. 1L at 443. Safeway sought a judgment of contribution requiring Nest-Kart to
pay an additional 30% of the judgment to achieve an equal apportionment between the
parties.
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 875, 876 (West 1988). Section 875 provided for contribu-
tion among joint defendants, while section 876 provided for an equal pro rata division
of the judgment.
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fendant and other responsible tortfeasors."155 Further, the court
quickly dismissed any concerns regarding conflicting social policies
behind strict products liability that might be undermined by its hold-
ing, pointing out that the appellate courts uniformly recognized con-
tribution in such cases.1m Indeed, allocation of damages based on a
comparative fault basis, rather than pro rata, achieved a more precise
and equitable apportionment.15 7
The court next addressed the logical fallacy of apportioning fault
between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant-the
fallacy being that the doctrine of strict liability is based on a "no
fault" concept, whereas negligence is premised on "fault."158
Although the court once again acknowledged that commentators
have argued that such an apportionment is like comparing "apples
and oranges," .59 the court maintained that "the suggested difficulties
are more theoretical than practical, and... juries are fully competent
to apply comparative fault principles between negligent and strictly
liable defendants."160 As proof of this proposition, the court pointed
out that the jury in the instant case was able to apportion fault be-
tween the two parties without difficulty.l6'
Finally, the court reasoned that a contrary conclusion would lead
to bizarre and irrational results.16 2 If a negligent defendant (one who
was found to be at fault) were allowed to apportion damages based on
comparative fault, he would be placed in a better position than a de-
fendant who was only strictly liable (one with whom fault was not
found) who was not allowed to apportion damages based on compara-
tive fault l 63 Such a result could not be justified.164 Since the case
155. Id.
156. Id See aLio Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co, 78 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 809, 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971);
Kerr Chemicals, Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 162, 165-66 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971).
157. Safeway, 579 P.2d at 445-46.
158. Id.
159. Id. See, e.g., Boone, Comparative Negligence: Solution or Problem?, CAL.
TRIAL LAW J. 17, 33 (Fall 1975); Harvey R. Levine, Strict Products Liability and Com-
parative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337,
351-56 (1977).
160. Safeway, 579 P.2d at 446. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
161. Sqfeway, 579 P.2d at 446. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
162. Safeway, 579 P.2d at 446.
163. Id. Similar reasoning recently led an appellate court to conclude that appor-
tionment of fault under Proposition 51 applied to situations where one defendant was
negligent and another acted intentionally. Weidenfeller v. Star and Garter, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). "It is inconceivable the voters intended that a negli-
gent tortfeasor's obligation to pay only its proportionate share of the non-economic loss
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did not involve derivative or vicarious liability, the court expressly
refused to decide whether the principles of comparative fault applied
to cases in which one party's liability was solely derivative or vicari-
ous in nature.16 5
5. Far West Financial Corporation v. D & S Company, Inc.
In 1988, the California Supreme Court revisited the concept of
comparative fault in Far West Financial Corporation v. D & S Corn-
pany, Inc.166 Far West, a real estate developer, contracted with D &
S, a general contractor, to build a condominium project.167 Shortly
after the completion and sale of the condominiums, several defects
appeared.168 Several years after a settlement and release agreement
had been reached between the homeowner's association and Far West
regarding the initial defects, many additional and much more serious
defects surfaced. 69 The homeowner's association subsequently filed
suit against Far West and D & S.170 Far West then filed a cross-com-
plaint for indemnity against D & S, alleging that D & S had complete
control over the construction site and any deficiencies were directly
attributable to D & S.171 Far West subsequently entered into a good
faith settlement agreement with the association pursuant to Califor-
nia Civil Code section 877.6.172 When D & S sought to do the same,
Far West unsuccessfully opposed the accompanying request for dis-
missal of Far West's cross-complaint for indemnity.173 The court of
... would become disproportionate . . . solely because the only other responsible
tortfeasor acted intentionally." Id, at 16.
164. Safeway, 579 P.2d at 446.
165. Id at 555 n.5.
In the instant case the jury found that Safeway was itself negligent in failing
to safely maintain its carts, and thus Safeway's liability is in no sense solely
derivative or vicarious. Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine in this
case whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situa-
tion in which a party's liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature.
Id Compare City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-73
(Wis. 1973) with Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (N.Y. 1972).
166. 760 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1988). For an in-depth analysis of the case, see Scott J. Hy-
man, Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. and the Abolition of Total Equitable In-
demnity: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 21 PAC. L.J. 147 (1989).
167. Far West, 760 P.2d at 401.
168. Id.
169. Id. These previously latent defects affected the roof, ground drainage, under-
ground plumbing, area lighting, building settlement, painting and exterior of the pro-
ject. Id
170. Id. The association also sued numerous subcontractors, engineering firms, and
architects who had also worked on the development. Id.
171. Id, at 402. D & S and several other contractors subsequently filed their own
indemnity cross-complaints against Far West and each other. Id,
172. Id See CAL. CIV. CODE § 877.6 (West 1992).
173. Id at 402-03. The right to indemnity has existed in California since 1872. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West 1974) (defining indemnity). Contribution, however, has
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appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal.174
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict in court of appeal decisions regarding this question. 175 Far
West claimed that since section 877.6 spoke only in terms of partial or
comparative indemnity, a party who is only vicariously or deriva-
tively liable should not be barred from total indemnity even after a
trial court adjudicates that, pursuant to section 877.6, the settlement
of the directly liable tortfeasor was in good faith.I76 D & S argued
that partial or comparative indemnity encompassed the entire spec-
trum of possible apportionments and therefore, no distinction be-
tween total and partial equitable indemnity should be drawn.177 The
court conceded that "the language of section 877.6 is, on its face, rea-
sonably susceptible to either of the suggested interpretations," and
thus, it needed to look to legislative history to resolve the question.178
However, the court explicitly stated that there was "no legitimate ba-
only been in existence since 1957. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875-77 (West 1980 and
Supp. 1989).
174. Far West, 760 P.2d at 403. The court of appeal, recognizing that prior appellate
decisions conflicted, agreed with the majority concluding that Far West's claim for to-
tal equitable indemnity was properly barred by the trial court's determination that the
settlement was in good faith and thus complied with Section 877.6. The judgment was
therefore affirmed. Id
175. I& at 403. Compare IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st
Dist. 1986) (claim barred); and Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 235 Cal.
Rptr. 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st. Dist. 1987) (claim barred); with County of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1984) (claim not barred); and
Bear Creek Planning Comm. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (Cal. Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1985) (clan not barred).
176. Far West, 760 P.2d at 403-04. "Joint tortfeasors" include those defendants
whose liability is vicarious or derivative. See e.g., Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 234
Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) qff'd 760 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1988); Turcon Constr. v.
Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("joint tortfeasor" includes
joint, concurrent and successive tortfeasors). But see Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co.,
760 P.2d 399, 414 (Cal. 1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[A] vicariously
liable defendant is not a 'tortfeasor' but an involuntary surety or guarantor .... An
indemnity claim based on vicarious liability is not premised on the relative fault or re-
sponsibility of the parties for the plaintiff's injury but rather on the simple fact that
the claimant has been compelled by force of law to pay for the tort of the one against
whom the claim is asserted.").
177. Far West, 760 P.2d at 404.
178. 1&
Although the statute does not expressly refer to 'total indemnity' claims, the
section does expressly apply to 'partial or comparative' indemnity claims; if
the Legislature clearly intended the section to apply only to claims seeking
partial indemnity, the reference to 'comparative' indemnity could be viewed as
superfluous. In context, the issue before us cannot properly be decided by ref-
erence to the 'plain language' of the statute itself.
Id (footnote omitted).
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sis for concluding that an indemnity action between a vicariously or
derivatively liable tortfeasor and a directly liable tortfeasor is not en-
compassed within section 877.6, subdivision (c), on the theory that
such an action is not "'based on principles of comparative fault.' "179
The court then outlined the evolution of indemnity, 80 explaining
that AMA combined total and partial indemnity into one equitable
comparative indemnity doctrine.'18 Therefore, the court concluded
that a tort defendant who enters into a good faith settlement under
Section 877.6 is thereafter insulated from any subsequent indemnity
claims. 8 2
6. Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter
In late 1991 in Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter,183 a California court
of appeal quite possibly expanded principles of comparative fault
even further. The plaintiff was a victim of an intentional assault in
the parking lot of a bar.184 The plaintiff sued the owners of the bar,
alleging negligence based upon inadequate lighting in the parking
lot.185 The jury found that the owners' negligence proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries.388 The jury attributed seventy-five
percent of the fault to the assailant, twenty percent of the fault to
the owners, and five percent of the fault to the plaintiff. 8 7 Pursuant
to Proposition 51, the trial court entered a judgment against the own-
ers for ninety-five percent of the economic damages and twenty per-
cent of the noneconomic damages. 8 8 The plaintiff appealed on the
grounds that Proposition 51 was inapplicable, claiming that the action
was not based upon principles of comparative fault because the assail-
ant acted intentionally. 8 9
The appellate court, rather than explicity addressing the plaintiff's
contention, skirted the comparative fault issue, choosing instead to
focus on fulfilling the policy concerns of the statute. The court
stated, "We think Weidenfeller's myopic view of the statute, focusing
on its words rather than its purpose, distorts the meaning of [Propo-
179. Id. at 404 n.7.
180. Id. at 404-07.
181. Id. at 407. Accord People ex reL Department of Transportation v. Superior
Court, 608 P.2d 673, 681 (Cal. 1980).
182. Far West, 760 P.2d at 413.
183. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14 (1991).
184. Id. at 15.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. The jury determined that Weidenfeller suffered economic damages of
$122,500 and non-economic damages of $250,000.
188. Id. The damage awards were thus reduced to $116,375 in economic loss (95%
of $122,500), and $50,000 in non-economic loss (20% of $250,000).
189. Id. at 15.
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sition 51]."190 The court then pointed out the potential irrational con-
sequences of adopting the plaintiff's reading of the statute,
concluding, "It is inconceivable the voters intended that a negligent
tortfeasor's obligation would become disproportionate ... solely be-
cause the only other tortfeasor acted intentionally."191 The court did,
however, implicitly ratify the lower court's application of compara-
tive fault principles by analogizing the case with Sofeway.192 If the
jury in Sofeway was "fully competent to apply comparative fault
principles between negligent and strictly liable defendants," then the
jury in this case could likewise competently compare the fault be-
tween negligent and intentional tortfeasors.193 Furthermore, the
court rejected as unpersuasive a contrary conclusion from a sister
state. 94 Instead of focusing on the "legislative intent" of the stat-
ute,195 the court could have followed the supreme court's advice in Li
to liberally apply principles of comparative fault'96 and could have,
and probably should have, decided the case on those grounds.
7. Summary
At common law, contributory negligence prevailed. A plaintiff's
cause of action was barred if her own negligence was found to be a
contributing cause to her damages.197 In Li, the California Supreme
Court adopted a new system of pure comparative negligence under
which the plaintiff's recovery was reduced in proportion to her de-
gree of fault, as determined by the jury.198 The court's next decision,
AMA, determined that fault could be apportioned on a comparative
190. Id at 15-16. The court further stated, "'Statutes must be construed in a rea-
sonable and common sense manner consistent with their apparent purpose and the leg-
islative intent underlying them-one practical, rather than technical, and one
promoting a wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity."' Id at 15 (quoting Herbert
Hawkins Realtors, Inc. v. Milheiser, 189 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1983)).
191. Id. at 16. The court reasoned that "to penalize the negligent tortfeasor in such
circumstances not only frustrates the purpose of the statute but violates the common
sense notion that a more culpable party should bear the financial burden caused by its
intentional act." Id
192. Id at 17.
193. Id
194. Id at 16 n.10. "To the extent Kansas courts have held the doctrine of compar-
ative fault is inapplicable to intentional torts in a situation such as here, we find those
decisions unpersuasive." Id
195. See supra note 191.
196. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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fault basis between co-tortfeasors.199 Under Daly, comparative negli-
gence was subsumed by the doctrine of comparative fault, thereby al-
lowing apportionment of fault between a negligent plaintiff and a
strictly liable defendant. 200 Then in Safeway, the court further ex-
panded comparative fault to include apportionment of fault between
a defendant liable in both negligence and strict products liability and
a defendant liable only in strict products liability.201 In Far West,
where both defendants were strictly liable, the court established that
the only type of indemnity remaining was comparative equitable in-
demnity and that it included the entire range of possible apportion-
ments.202 Further, the court suggested that fault could be equitably
apportioned between directly liable tortfeasors and those who were
only derivatively or vicariously liable.203 Finally, in Weidenfeller, an
appellate court impliedly sanctioned application of principles of com-
parative fault between negligent and intentional tortfeasors.2o4
8. Analysis of the Hypothetical Case
The second prong of the proposed Proposition 51 test requires a de-
termination that the cause of action is one for personal injury, prop-
erty damage, or wrongful death based upon principles of comparative
fault. In the hypothetical case, the presupposition was that a con-
sumer suffered personal injury and was suing to recover damages.2O5
Therefore, the inquiry should focus solely on whether a retailer's lia-
bility for plaintiff's injury, which is primarily derivative based only
upon its place in the chain of distribution, is one based on principles
of comparative fault.206 First, the retailer's liability will be analyzed
as though it were only derivative. Then the retailer's liability will be
analyzed as if it were direct.
Although the issue has not been expressly decided yet, previous de-
cisions of the California Supreme Court strongly suggest that com-
parative fault principles should apply to the hypothetical situation.
The court first hinted at this result in a footnote in Sofeway by ex-
pressly refusing to decide the question. In the words of the court,
"We have no occasion to determine in this case whether the compara-
tive indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in which a
party's liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature."207 If the
court had felt strongly otherwise, it could have easily stated that
199. See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 143-65 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
203. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
207. Safeway Stores Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 446 n.5 (Cal. 1978).
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comparative fault principles do not apply to those situations, and the
issue would have been easily resolved.20 8
The court next addressed this question, again in dicta, in Daly.2o9
The plaintiff in Daly had objected to the merger of comparative fault
and strict liability, complaining that it would abolish or adversely af-
fect the liability of retailers in the chain of distribution.210 The court,
however, did not anticipate any problems with the merger, declaring
that if "jurors are capable of assessing fully and fairly the legal re-
sponsibility of a manufacturer on a strict liability basis, no reason ap-
pears why they cannot do likewise with respect to subsequent
distributors and vendors of the product." 211 This seems to state in no
uncertain terms that the court sanctions the apportionment of fault
between a derivatively liable retailer and a directly liable manufac-
turer. Justice Mosk, in his dissent, seemingly agrees with this au-
thor's interpretation of the majority's assessment of the law,2 1 2
stating in defiance of the majority that it would be "consummate su-
pererogation for a trier of fact to attempt to measure some consumer
negligence against either the faulty design of the product or the re-
sponsibility of the congeries of nonnegligent persons who place the
defective product in the stream of commerce, or their responsibility
vis-d-vis each other."2 13
Conflict subsequently arose in the courts of appeal as to whether
such apportionment was permissible. In Angelus Associates Corp. v.
Neonex Leisure Products, Inc.,214 the Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District, Division Three argued that "[a]s to the person or entity ulti-
mately responsible for the defective product, the retailer is neither a
wrongdoer nor a tortfeasor. And where there is no wrongdoing to
208. Granted, courts cannot properly address via an advisory opinion issues not con-
fronting the court, but in reality they often do. See infra notes 209-13 where the court
hypothetically addresses an issue that is not before it. At the very least, the footnote
suggests that the court considered the possibility.
209. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
210. Id at 1170. "We find equally unpersuasive a final objection that the merger of
the two principles somehow will abolish or adversely affect the liability of such inter-
mediate entities in the chain of distribution as retailers .... We foresee no such conse-
quence." Id. (citing Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d ,168 (Cal. 1964)).
211. Id. The court had no occasion to decide this particular issue but still gave its
opinion on how it :may rule if the issue arose in the future. See supra note 208 and
accompanying text.
212. Daly, 575 P.2d at 1183 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "The majority see no problem in
assessing the liability of intermediate entities in the commercial chain. I do." Id,
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
213. Id (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
214. 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
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apportion, the principles of comparative fault cannot apply."215 The
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division One in Standard
Pacific of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corporation,216 specifically re-
sponded to Angelus, retorting, "We fault this reasoning. Wrongdoing
can be apportioned 100 percent to the manufacturer and zero percent
to the innocent retailer."217 The California Supreme Court adopted
the Standard Pacific view in Far West. 218
In Far West, the court rejected the position in Angelus, stating
"there is no legitimate basis for concluding than an indemnity action
between a vicariously or derivatively liable tortfeasor and a directly
liable tortfeasor is not encompassed within section 877.6, subdivision
(c) on the theory that such an action is not 'based on comparative
negligence or comparative fault.' "219 Perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, the court went on to say that "we have never viewed the
'comparative fault' terminology as so restrictive as to exclude the eq-
uitable allocation of loss between vicariously and directly liable
tortfeasors."2 20 In fact, the court stated that the term "equitable allo-
cation of apportionment of loss" was probably a more appropriate
term than "comparative fault."221 The court rationalized this view on
policy grounds, declaring that "'even in cases in which one or more
tortfeasors' liability rests on the principles of strict liability, fairness
and other tort policies, such as deterrence of dangerous conduct or
encouragement of accident-reducing behavior, frequently call for an
apportionment of liability among multiple tortfeasors.' "222
Therefore, it appears that the only rational interpretation of the
California Supreme Court's views is that principles of comparative
fault, based on an equitable allocation of fault, apply to vicariously or
derivatively liable tortfeasors. Thus, under a derivative liability anal-
ysis, the retailer in the hypothetical test case would pass the second
prong of the proposed test.
Theoretical problems arise with this line of reasoning, however.
While the retailer's liability is in some sense primarily derivative,
based upon its place in the chain of distribution, its liability in other
215. Id. at 409.
216. 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
217. Id. at 112.
218. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
219. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 760 P.2d 399, 404 n.7 (Cal. 1988).
220. Id. (emphasis added). See also Standard Pacifw, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
"Given the predicate that comparative fault principles are to be applied to strict liabil-
ity cases, reason and logic compel the conclusion that equitably interpreted the stat-
ute's [section 877.6] broad language includes such parties whose legal responsibilities
are derivative or vicarious in nature." Id.
221. Far West, 760 P.2d at 404 n.7 (quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d
1162, 1168 (Cal. 1978)),
222. Id. at 410 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 702
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972)).
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senses is direct. Strict liability in tort arises when an entity is instru-
mental in placing a product in the stream of commerce knowing that
the product is to be used without inspection for defects, and the prod-
uct is defective, causing injury when used in the intended way.2 2 3
Strict liability also applies to sellers who are engaged in the business
of selling such products, even though the seller has exercised all pos-
sible care toward the purchaser.224 This is the case because strict lia-
bility does not derive from any fault of the defendant, but is based
solely on public policy concerns that attach liability without regard to
fault once an entity assists in placing a product into the stream of
commerce.2 25 Furthermore, as one court has noted, "[t]he retailer's
liability is coextensive with that of the manufacturer of the prod-
uct."226 The purpose of such a harsh rule is to protect the consumers
who are "powerless to protect themselves." 227
The manufacturer, as the maker/designer of the product, is di-
rectly responsible for the damages that result from the defect. But,
in a very real sense, so is the retailer who, by providing the mecha-
nism through which the consumer can obtain the product, is also in-
strumental in placing the product in the stream of commerce.
Without the manufacturer making the product, no one can be injured
by it. Yet, without the retailer distributing the product, no one can
be injured by it either.
The theoretical problem with applying principles of comparative
fault to this type of situation arises when determining an appropriate
standard by which to allocate the fault among the parties. In order
to properly equip a jury, the judge must give the jury a standard or
mechanism by which they can apportion fault. Intuitively, it seems
that the entity who makes the product should be more responsible or
blameworthy than one who merely sells it. After all, the manufac-
turer created, assembled, or designed the defective product-that is,
brought into existence that which was previously nonexistent. The
retailer, on the other hand, merely passed along the product from
223. RESTATEME:NT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1962); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D Products Liabil-
ity § 16 (1979).
224. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f; 50 CAL. JuR. 3D Products
Liability § 16 (1979).
225. See id.
226. Midgley v. S. S. Kresge Co., 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing
Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725 (Cal. 1970)). However, Price only held that a
retailer is similarly liable to the manufacturer. Price, 466 P.2d at 725.
227. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1978); see also 50 CAL.
JUR. 3D Products Liability § 17 (1979).
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one party to the next, and intuitively should, therefore, bear less of
the responsibility than the manufacturer.228 Unfortunately, to date
all there seems to be by way of a standard is this intuition.
Academic integrity demands the development of a standard that at
least in theory would justify the use of a system of comparative fault
in the chain of distribution. The ultimate question is, what should
that standard be? A rigid pro rata apportionment would not really
be a true comparison of fault, but rather the performance of a simple
math problem-adding the number of defendants and dividing by
100-to determine the percentage of fault allocated to each defend-
ant. This system would not achieve the goals set forth in Li and its
progeny of apportioning liability in closer proportion to fault,2 29 and
therefore would not be defensible.
Adherence to the traditional common law total indemnity stan-
dard, since abandoned in California, results in a total shifting of fault
from the retailer to the manufacturer. This approach is altogether
unsatisfying because shifting fault and comparing fault are really en-
tirely different concepts.2 30 Commentators complained that allowing
a comparison of fault between a negligent tortfeasor and a strictly li-
able tortfeasor is like comparing an apple and an orange. This author
submits that comparing the fault of a strictly liable tortfeasor with
another strictly liable tortfeasor in the chain of distribution is like
comparing an apple with itself.2 3 '
It may, however, be possible to use the factors or policy concerns
that underlie strict products liability to develop a standard that could
228. For purposes of illustration, the retailer can be analogized with a common car-
rier. In the hypothetical fact situation, the retailer received a sealed product from the
manufacturer and subsequently sold it to a consumer in exactly the same condition it
was received. By doing this, the retailer was instrumental in placing a product in the
stream of commerce, and thus strictly liable. Similarly, if Federal Express delivered
the sealed package containing the defective product from the manufacturer to the con-
sumer, Federal Express would also be instrumental in placing the product in the
stream of commerce. Of course the common carrier is not a seller and is thus not
strictly liable in tort, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, but this illustrates
that the standard by which to compare the relative fault of the manufacturer and re-
taller should be based solely on the entity's role in the distribution process.
229. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
230. This also would not achieve the goals of Li. See id
231. The reasoning is as follows: If comparing the negligence of one party with the
negligence of another party is like comparing an orange with another orange, and if
comparing the negligence of one party with the strict liability of another party is like
comparing an orange with an apple, then comparing the strict liability of a manufac-
turer with the strict liability of a retailer for an injury caused by a defective product is
like comparing an apple with itself. It is not comparing an apple with another apple
because there is no standard against which to -compare relative conduct of the parties.
At least in negligence cases (orange with orange), the trier of fact can measure the
parties' relative deviations from the well-recognized standard of the average reason-
able person. In contrast, in strict liability cases (apple with itself), both parties did
what, by definition, makes them liable-they were instrumental in placing the product
into the chain of commerce. No more or less culpable conduct was possible.
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be at least theoretically defensible. Strict products liability was first
suggested by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling CO.232 This history provides a possible springboard
to developing a future standard to apportion fault among strictly lia-
ble entities in the chain of distribution.
9. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Justice Traymor's concurring opinion in Escola233 gave a glimpse of
what was to come in strict products liability. The plaintiff in Escola
was injured when a Coca-Cola bottle broke in her hand.234 Unable to
prove any specific acts of negligence, the plaintiff relied completely
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish Coca-Cola's liabil-
ity.2 3 5 After applying the facts of the case to the elements of res
ipsa,238 a majority of the California Supreme Court concluded that
the plaintiff had met her burden of proof and affirmed the lower
court judgment in favor of the plaintiff.237 Justice Traynor filed a
separate opinion concurring in the judgment.238
Traynor argued that "it should now be recognized that a manufac-
turer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has placed
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."239
Three primary grounds were cited to justify imposing liability.240
First, the policy of accident prevention demanded that responsibility
be placed where it would most effectively reduce the potential inju-
ries caused by defective products.2 41 The manufacturer of the prod-
232. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
233. Id.
234. Id at 437.
235. Id. at 438.
236. Id. at 438-40.
237. Id. at 440.
238. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
239. Id (Traynor, J., concurring). Traynor pointed out that California has recog-
nized the principle established in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916), that "irrespective of privity of contract, the manufacturer is responsible for an
injury caused by such an article to any person who comes in lawful contact with it."
Escoia, 150 P.2d at 400 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citing Sheward v. Virtue, 126 P.2d 345
(Cal. 1942); Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 34 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1934)).
240. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also KEETON et al.,
supra note 68, § 98.
241. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also KEETON et al.,
supra note 68, at § 98. "The cause of accident prevention can be promoted by the adop-
tion of strict liability and the elimination of the necessity for proving negligence." Es-
cola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Critics argue,
however, that the effects of strict liability may include elimination of negligence, but
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uct would obviously be better able to anticipate such dangers than
would an unsuspecting customer.2 = Second, the risk of injury is a
cost of doing business that could more easily be insured against and
distributed among a greater number of people by the manufacturer
than by a consumer. 243 Public policy, therefore, demanded that the
risk should fall on those entities responsible for the defective product
reaching the market.24 Third, the injured party is often unable to
prove the cause of the defect or any negligence on the part of the
manufacturer. 245 Therefore, Traynor concluded, "The manufac-
turer's obligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing
relationship between them."2
Traynor also addressed the accompanying liability of the retailer.
He pointed out that public policy demanded that the consumer be in-
sured against injury at the retailer's expense.24 7 Traynor further ar-
gued that the courts recognize that the retailer cannot bear such a
burden, and thus do allow the retailer to recoup the attendant losses
from the manufacturer. 248 Traynor's final thoughts suggest that he
will also tend to inhibit the development of new products. Id. (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
242. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). "The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured .... for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost
of doing business." Id. (Traynor, J., concurring). See also KEETON et al., supra note 68,
§ 98. '"Those who are merchants and especially those engaged in the mant4facturing
enterprise have the capacity to distribute the losses of the few among the many who
purchase the products. It is not a 'deep pocket' theory but rather a 'risk-bearing eco-
nomic' theory." Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves." Id. at 901.
245. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also KEETON et al., sUpra
note 68, § 98. "[Flor institutional reasons ... proof of the existence of fault or negli-
gence in the sale of a defective product should no longer be required.. ." Id.
246. Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring). To justify this increased re-
sponsibility on the manufacturer, Traynor pointed out that the consumer no longer
has the skill or desire to adequately investigate the product prior to purchase because
he has been "lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by
advertising and marketing devices .... Id. (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted). He further noted that consumers are purchasing on faith based upon increasing
standards of inspection and a willingness of the manufacturer to give replacements or
refunds for defective products. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
247. 1I at 441-42 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Goetten v. Owl Drug Co., 59
P.2d 142 (Cal. 1936); Gindraux v. Maurice Mercantile Co., 47 P.2d 708 (Cal. 1935).
248. Escola, 150 P.2d at 442 (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Davis v. Air Tech.
Indus., Inc., 582 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Cal. 1978) (when manufacturers and retailers are
strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product, the manufacturer is required
to pay the plaintiff's damages); Angelus Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products,
Inc., 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 404 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (even in the absence of an indemnity
contract, persons not at fault are entitled to indemnity from those that are at fault,
based upon equitable principles).
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believed, at least intuitively, that a comparison between the retailer's
fault and the manufacturer's fault was indeed possible: "Certainly
there is greater reason to impose liability on the manufacturer than
on the retailer who is but a conduit of a product that he is himself
not able to test."2 49 Developing a standard to enable quantification of
that "greater reason" is the task at hand.
10. Proposed Standard
A standard by which to compare the fault of the retailer and the
manufacturer in the chain of distribution250 can be derived from an
application of the three factors set forth in Escola, and echoed by
Prosser and Keeton, to each party.25 ' In negligence cases, the stan-
dard of reasonable care is a measuring point against which each
party's conduct is compared to determine the relative fault.252 Since
strict products liability is premised on "no fault" in which "reason-
able care" plays no part,253 a similar standard cannot be applied.
However, at least in theory, each strictly liable defendant's conduct
could be adjudged according to the applicability of the three policy
factors undergirding liability: accident prevention, risk distribution,
and problems of proof.254
a. Accident prevention
Applying the articulated factors to the hypothetical situation,25 5 as
Justice Traynor suggested, greater liability will likely be attributed
to the manufacturer than the retailer.256 The first factor to be con-
sidered is the policy of accident prevention accomplished through the
reduction of defective products that reach consumers.257 The inquiry
249. Escola, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (Traynor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
250. The statute may likewise by applied to any two defendants who are strictly
liable for the plaintiff's damages.
251. It should be noted at the outset that this author does not claim to have the
ultimate wisdom as to the standard that may or should be developed to justify the ap-
plication of principles of comparative fault to chain of distribution situations. Rather, I
merely propose one possible solution, admittedly simplistic, to a complex theoretical
problem.
252. In actuality, the jury probably decides who should bear what portion of the
loss based upon the respective conduct of the parties.
253. See Safeway Stores Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 579 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1978).
254. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
255. To refresh the reader's memory as to the presumptions made in the hypotheti-
cal case, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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should be limited to which of the parties, as a result of the imposition
of strict liability, would be both willing and able to respond most ef-
fectively in an effort to curtail future defects in the product. In other
words, what allocation of responsibility between the retailer and the
manufacturer will best serve to fulfill the societal goal of accident
prevention? This admittedly seeks an intuitive response based upon
one's personal judgment, but it is now at least based upon an articu-
lated and arguably justifiable standard.258 Common sense and expe-
rience in a market-driven economy suggest that a manufacturer
would be more willing to remedy future defects in its product than
would a retailer. The reason for this is that market forces would the-
oretically react by a decrease in demand for the defective product, in
turn causing an increase in demand for substitute products. A re-
tailer, not having much, if any, capital invested in the product, could
more easily accommodate the distribution of the substituted goods
than could the manufacturer.259 The manufacturer would also be
more able to curtail future accidents caused by the distribution of de-
fective products simply because it would have greater access to deter-
mining the cause of the defect and greater skill in developing a
remedy. Therefore, the manufacturer should and presumably would
be attributed most, if not all, of the fault/responsibility under the
first factor.
b. Risk allocation
The second factor that could serve as a standard for the allocation
of fault in a strict products liability situation is risk allocation. Those
engaged in the enterprise of product distribution are to a certain ex-
tent capable of spreading the losses incurred from defective products
of the few among the many who purchase the products.26 0 This in-
quiry should focus primarily on which party should, based upon its
role in the chain of distribution, bear the greater share of the burden
of risk allocation. Again, this calls upon the intuition of the observer,
but it is at least based upon an articulated standard. The danger in
the application of this factor is that the trier of fact may erroneously
look primarily to the deep pocket defendant to bear the greater share
of the burden of risk spreading because it is better able to reallocate
such losses.261 The manufacturer deals in much larger quantities of
258. That is, justifiable in the opinion of this author based upon the policy goals of
strict products liability.
259. Granted, the retailer could and probably would lose a certain amount of busi-
ness and consequently profits due to bad publicity, etc., as a result of selling the defec-
tive product. But the retailer, because of its diversification, could more easily adjust to
the change than could a manufacturer.
260. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
261. This may be what juries end up doing anyway. This does not mean, however,
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the particular product and would thus be in a better position to dis-
tribute the loss caused by the product among the many purchasers.26 2
It would be pure speculation to predict what the outcome of such ap-
portionment would be, but if the trier of fact agreed with Justice
Traynor and this author, the manufacturer would again be appor-
tioned most if not all of the fault/responsibility under the risk
spreading factor.
c. Diffiwulty of proof
The difficulty of proof is the third factor that could be considered
an applicable standard in apportioning relative fault/responsibility in
strict products liability actions. This factor does not as easily lend it-
self to quantifiable analysis, but nevertheless should be contem-
plated. In light of the policy concerns underlying this factor,263 the
inquiry should probably focus on which of the parties is most benefit-
ted by and responsible for the problems in proof. At first blush, one
would think that both the retailer and the manufacturer would be
equally benefitted by the problems in proof, because if the plaintiff
cannot prove her case then neither is liable. However, this may not
necessarily be true. For example, if the product is found to have a
design defect, then the whole product line would likely be deemed
unmerchantable.2 6 4 As a result, the retailer would lose the opportu-
nity to sell the products in its inventory, but the manufacturer would
lose the opportunity to sell not only what is in its inventory, but also
the expectancy income from future production and sales.265 The
manufacturer should undoubtedly bear more responsibility for the
problems of proof because it is presumably in possession of the rele-
vant documents, 266 has access to key employees who may have infor-
mation regarding the defect and any other relevant information
essential to proving or disproving the plaintiff's case. The retailer,
on the other hand, would be unlikely to have much information tend-
that the system is flawed merely because the mode of implementation chooses to ig-
nore its mandates.
262. This is generally true, unless the retailer is the exclusive dealer of the manu-
facturer's product.
263. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
264. See U.C.C. § 2-314.
265. Presumably the retailer's inventory would be much smaller than the manufac-
turer's; however, exceptions will inevitably exist. The retailer would also lose expec-
tancy income, but could probably more easily replace it with substitute goods than
could a manufacturer.
266. For example, blueprints, records of calls placed or received regarding the de-
fect, employee timesheets, and whatever other documents that may be relevant.
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ing to prove or disprove the existence of a defect in the product that
would not be readily discoverable by the plaintiff. Therefore, apply-
ing the third policy factor behind strict products liability, the great
majority of the fault/responsibility would again rest on the manufac-
turer. Application of the above three factors would most likely result
in the manufacturer being apportioned virtually all of the fault/re-
sponsibility for placing the defective product into the chain of distri-
bution--an intuitively just result.
The above proposed analysis is at best shaky,267 and when
presented to a jury would likely be unworkable. Instructing a jury
composed of laypeople with little or no experience in law would pres-
ent serious communication problems. Complex and confusing in-
structions would often be misunderstood, misapplied, or simply
ignored. A jury would probably fall back on what the proposed
three-factor test sought to eliminate: the jury's intuition and basic
sense of fairness. Fortunately, a form jury instruction has already
been drafted and incorporated into the Book of Approved Jury In-
structions (BAJI) that could easily be applied to this situation.
d, BAJI 16.12
The BAJI Committee, as a result of the enactment of Proposition
51, was forced to make numerous alterations and one addition to the
approved instructions in order to reflect the statute's changes.268
Number 16.12 is particularly relevant to the hypothetical case.269 En-
titled "PRODUCTS LIABILITY--COMPARATIVE FAULT AND
COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY BETWEEN DEFEND-
ANTS-SPECIAL VERDICT FORM," the instruction appears to
sanction apportionment of fault among all defendants in a strict
products liability actions. Questions one through seven establish
whether the product was defective and, if so, whose actions were the
cause.270 Question eight then asks the jury to decide what percentage
of the comparative fault is attributable to the defendant[s] and all
other persons.2 71 This is consistent with the court of appeal decision
in Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc.272 apportioning fault among all respon-
267. Many other problems arise in the implementation of such a standard. For ex-
ample, establishing the relevance to the plaintiff's case of the collateral issues that
would have to be resolved between the manufacturer and retailer. The trial would be
substantially lengthened to accommodate the additional testimony and proof.
268. B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw TORTS § 53 (9th ed. 1988). Thirty
existing instructions were revised and one was added: No. 14.76, defining economic and
noneconomic damages.
269. BAJI, No. 16.12 (7th ed. 1986 and Supp. 1992).
270. Id
271. Id
272. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See infra at notes 277-90 and accompa-
nying text.
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sible parties, not just those at trial. It also seems consistent with the
apportionment of fault between the retailer and the manufacturer of
a defective product. However, question eight sets forth no standard
by which to compare the relative fault of the plaintiffs and defend-
ants; it merely asks the jury to do so. The standard applied by the
jury will, therefore, inevitably be intuitive.
The uncertainty regarding applicability of the instruction is further
apparent in the language of the USE NOTE following the instruction,
which states, "This form of Special Verdict is designed only for use in
cases involving defective products strict liability with comparative
fault and claims of comparative implied indemnity."2 73 The language
of the instruction presupposes that principles of comparative fault ap-
ply to the underlying case.274 However, since Far West abolished to-
tal implied indenmity,275 all indemnity claims are presumably now
determined on an equitable comparative basis.
In summary, theoretical standards may be developed to justify ap-
plying principles of comparative fault to entities in the chain of dis-
tribution. These standards could be derived from the factors used to
justify the doctrine of strict products liability set forth by Judge
Traynor in Escola. However, practical concerns suggest that the only
workable solution would be to apply principles of comparative fault
to the chain of distribution cases based solely on the jury's intuition
and sense of fairness. BAJI 16.12 provides the means by which this
could be accomplished. Therefore, in keeping with Li's liberal con-
struction principles7 6 and in light of supreme court dicta indicating
its apparent approval, lower courts could and probably should apply
principles of comparative fault to strict products liability chain of dis-
tribution cases.
11. Who Are Defendants?
The related issue of who are "defendants" for purposes of Proposi-
tion 51 analysis also needs to be addressed. Should the jury be in-
structed to apportion fault between only those parties present at
trial, or should the jury take into account all culpable parties both
present and absent? Very recently a California appellate court con-
273. BAJI, No. 16.12. Conspicuously absent from the USE NOTE are customary ci-
tations to cases in which the instruction has been given or referred to.
274. BAJI, No. 16.12, question eight.
275. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
1531
fronted this very question.277
In Mills v. MMM Carpets, the plaintiff was injured when the heel
of her shoe punctured a section of carpet that had been placed over
an uncovered utility hole.278 The plaintiff subsequently sued the
building manager, the carpet installer (MMM), and the building own-
ers.2 79 The plaintiff also recovered from her employer in a workers'
compensation claim.28 0 The defendants sought an apportionment of
fault under Proposition 51 in an attempt to reduce their liability in
proportion with the employer's relative fault.281 The trial court
ruled in limine that the jury would be allowed to apportion relative
fault between all parties, but only for purposes of the employer's ac-
tion against the named defendants for indemnity.2 2 Therefore, the
percentage of fault attributable to the employer could not be consid-
ered in determining the amount of noneconomic loss that the named
defendants would have to pay.283 Following the trial, the jury re-
turned a special verdict apportioning fault as follows: Sixty percent
to the employer, thirty percent to MMM, and ten percent to the
building manager.28 4 The trial court, in accordance with its pre-trial
ruling, excluded the employer's fault and assigned seventy-five per-
cent of the liability for noneconomic loss to MMM and twenty-five
percent to the building manager. 28 5 MMM appealed the judgment.
On appeal, the court quoted nearly three pages of Evangelatos set-
ting forth the background and development of Proposition 51 and ul-
.277. Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For a
discussion that preceded Mills of how "defendant" should be construed for purposes of
Proposition 51, see Barbara A. Allen, Stacy Allen and Susan R. Swift, California's
Proposition 51: Ambiguities in Apportionment and the Impact of Federal Interpleader
and Intra-State Settlement, 12 WHITIE L. REV. 273, (1991). Allen argues that CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1431.2 should be amended to ensure that the responsibility of all
tortfeasors, not just those present at trial, should be considered when apportioning
fault. Id, In the alternative she suggests that the courts should interpret the statute to
accomplish such a result. Id. The court in Mills adopted the latter alternative. After
this paper was written, the Supreme Court of California in DaFonte v. Upright, 828
P.2d 140 (1992), substantially affirmed the holding in Mills. The court held that "sec-
tion 1431.2 plainly limits a defendant's share of noneconomic damages to his or her
own proportionate share of comparative fault." Id. at 147. For an in-depth discussion
of DaFonte, see David C. Wright, California Supreme Court Survey, DaFonte v. Up-
right, 20 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
278. Mills, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 814.
279. I&
280. Id.
281. Id. at 814-15.
282. Id. at 815.
283. Id
284. Id,
285. Id These figures were arrived at by adding MMM's 30% of the fault and the
building manager's 10% of the fault to get 40% of the total fault that was present at
the trial. Id. Then, by dividing MMM's 30% by the total 40%, the 75% figure was
reached. Id Similarly, the building manager's 10% was divided by 40% to get its 25%
allotment. Id.
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timately concluded that apportionment of liability for purposes of
Proposition 5. "must take into account the fault of all tortfeasors,
whether or not they are named as defendants, subject to liability for
damages, or capable of responding in damages."286 The court rea-
soned that it would be bound to give effect to the ordinary language
used in the statute.2 8 7 The court then concluded that the statute's
phrase "defendant's percentage of fault," when examined in context
does not vary in relation to the absence or presence of other responsi-
ble parties.288 Rather, the statutory language suggests comparison
with the fault of the entire field of tortfeasors.2 89 Therefore, the ap-
pellate court reversed the trial court's decision and directed the trial
court to enter judgment in accordance with the jury's original finding
of thirty percent liability against MMM.29o
Applying the above holding to the hypothetical test case, the re-
tailer would be entitled to an apportionment of fault based upon the
jury's consideration of all culpable tortfeasors whether present or ab-
sent. Therefore, the insolvent manufacturer's relative culpability
would be considered and apportioned along with the retailer's,
thereby reducing the amount that the retailer would have to pay.
This is really the only rational conclusion based on a faithful inter-
pretation of the Proposition given an analysis of the third prong of
the Proposition 51 test-the policy reasons for the adoption of the
initiative.
D. Policy
Proposition 51 was a voter-enacted initiative adopted in attempt to
remedy perceived injustices.291 The statute itself details the dual un-
derlying policy concerns that were sought to be redressed in its en-
actment. The first policy concern addresses the desire to protect both
public and private defendants from the "inequity and injustice" that
results from a strict application of joint and several liability through
oppressive judgments that are based on the defendant's ability to
pay.292 The statute claims that often governmental and private de-
286. Id at 814.
287. Id at 816 (citing California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College
Dist., 621 P.2d 856 (Cal. 1981)) ("Courts are bound to give effect to statutes according
to the usual ordinary import of the language used.").
288. I& at 816-17.
289. IM at 818.
290. I
291. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
292. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.1(a) (West 1992).
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fendants who are perceived to have deep pockets or substantial insur-
ance coverage are included in lawsuits when there is little or no basis
for finding them at fault.293 These inequitable judgments have
threatened local governments, public agencies, and private individu-
als and businesses with bankruptcy. 294 In order to remedy these in-
equities, the statute mandates that "defendants in tort actions shall
be held financially liable in closer proportion to their degree of fault.
To treat them differently is unfair and inequitable."295 These
changes were found to be necessary in order to "avoid catastrophic
economic consequences for state and local governmental bodies as
well as private individuals and businesses."29 6 Therefore, the first
policy concern of preventing inequity and injustice to defendants
would be fulfilled in cases in which the defendant is liable in direct
proportion to his fault.
The second policy concern addressed by the statute was to remedy
the increased burden placed on the consumer/taxpayer as a result of
joint and several liability. The judgments against the governments,
agencies, private individuals and entities were being borne by the
consumer/taxpayer in the form of higher prices for goods and serv-
ices and higher taxes.2 7 The consumer/taxpayer was further bur-
dened by the curtailment of police, fire, and other protections
"because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums."298
Therefore, the second policy concern would be fulfilled in cases in
which the financial burden of large, otherwise unsatisfied judgments
does not fall on the consumer/taxpayer.
California voters were forced to balance these dual policy concerns
against the policy concerns that were the basis for joint and several
liability.299 As their votes demonstrate, the voters ultimately con-
cluded that the injustice to minimally blameworthy entities and the
increased economic burden on the consumer/taxpayer outweighed
the interests in fully compensating the injured plaintiff.
1. Analysis
In order for the hypothetical case to pass the third prong of the
Proposition 51 test, its application must fulfill the policy concerns un-
derlying its enactment. The first policy concern is for equity and jus-
tice to defendants. Retailers do not actively produce a defective
product, but merely act as a conduit connecting the manufacturer
293. Id. at § 1431.1(b).
294. Id, at § 1431.1(a).
295. Id, at § 1431.1(c).
296. Id
297. Id. at § 1431.1(a) (West 1992).
298. Id. at § 1431.1(c).
299. See supra at notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
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with the consumer. Thus, there is arguably "little or no basis for
finding them at fault." 3° ° The only basis for including retailers in the
action is under a "no fault" strict liability theory, based upon policy
reasons which the voters explicitly rejected by enacting Proposition
51.301 Both small and large retailers with large product liability
awards against them could easily be faced with increased financial
hardships or even bankruptcy if forced to pay the entire judgment
due to the inu;olvency of the manufacturer.30 2 Equity, therefore, de-
mands that juries be instructed to apportion fault on a comparative
fault basis at trial, in accordance with BAJI 16.12. 303 Therefore, the
first policy concern would be fulfilled by applying Proposition 51 to
the hypothetical case.
The second policy concern underlying Proposition 51 is the in-
creased financial burden that consumers are no longer willing to
bear. The effect of imposing joint and several liability on retailers is
simply illustrated in the attached graph.304 Large judgments against
retailers shift the supply curve up and to the left from S to S1. A
new equilibrium point is established at El. At El, fewer goods are
sold at a higher price, yielding fewer profits to the corporation. As a
direct result, fewer consumers will be able to purchase the product
and will have -to buy it at a higher price. Moreover, as a direct result
of fewer goods being purchased, fewer goods will be manufactured,
thereby creating an adverse effect on the job market and reducing
the demand upon suppliers for raw materials. Further, stock prices
will decline as will dividend yield to stockholders. Therefore, the
consumer/taxpayer and the economy as a whole is forced to bear the
burden of compensating individual plaintiffs. These negative effects
are precisely those which the proponents of Proposition 51 sought to
avoid.
Reasonable people may disagree as to the most efficient and fair
way to allocate damages among plaintiffs and defendants. Scholars
and laypersons alike may debate the motives and integrity of those
who sponsored and advocated adoption of the statute. This, however,
is not the duty of the courts. The voters unequivocally chose the de-
fendants (and ultimately themselves), over the plaintiffs. Simply
300. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(b) (West 1992).
301. Id,
302. That is, if they do not have adequate insurance coverage or are self-insured.
But even if they do have adequate coverage, premiums will rise or the retailer may
become no longer insurable.
303. See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
304. See appendix A.
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stated, apportionment of fault between a strictly liable retailer and
an absent manufacturer fulfills the dual policy concerns enunciated
in the statute. Therefore, the third prong of the proposed test is
satisfied.
IV. OTHER STATES
While the precise language of Proposition 51 is exclusive to Califor-
nia, other states have enacted similar statutes to curtail the applica-
tion of joint and several liability. During 1986 and 1987,
approximately half of the states enacted legislation reforming joint
and several liability to combat the insurance crisis and the perceived
unfairness of joint and several liability.305 Some jurisdictions went as
far as to totally abolish joint and several liability, while others only
slightly changed its effects.30o One commentator classified the states'
reforms into six categories:30 7
1. Modification of joint and several liability by providing for the
reallocation of loss among remaining parties to the litigation, includ-
ing the plaintiff in some cases;308
2. elimination of joint and several liability but preserving it for
certain types of actions, such as products liability or environmental
tort actions;309
3. elimination of joint and several liability, but only for certain
types of losses;31 0
4. elimination of joint and several liability only for losses under a
specified amount;31 '
5. elimination of joint and several liability for defendants who are
under a certain percentage of fault;3 12 and
6. elimination of joint and several liability only where the plain-
tiff is at fault or is more at fault than the defendant.313
The above categories are not mutually exclusive.
Of the states that limit application of their statutes to certain types
305. See Mike Steenson, Recent Legislative Responses to the Rule of Joint and Sev-
eral Liability, XXIII TEX. INT'L L.J. 482 (1988); James J. Scheske, The Reform of Joint
and Several Liability Theory: A Survey of State Approaches, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 627
(Winter 1988).
306. Steenson, supra note 305, at 485.
307. Id
308. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1992) (includes plaintiff in reallocation)
with 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts 87-227, § 3(d) (excludes plaintiff in reallocation).
309. See, e.g., HAW. S.B. No. S-86 § 17(2)(B)-(E).
310. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R.
1601 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
311. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992) (preserves joint and sev-
eral liability for damages that do not exceed $25,000).
312. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1992) (parties who are under 50% at
fault are only severally liable).
313. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1992).
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of actions, there is disagreement in the area of strict products liabil-
ity.314 Some state statutes expressly preserve joint and several liabil-
ity for strict products liability actions,3 15 while others explicitly limit
the application of joint and several liability in such claims.31 6 Be-
cause Proposition 51 is silent regarding its application to strict prod-
ucts liability stream of commerce claims against a retailer, it is,
therefore, prudent to consider the relevant views of sister states.
In cases arising from the manufacture, sale, or use of a product,
Minnesota's statute expressly reallocates any uncollectible amount
from any entity in the chain of distribution to all other persons in the
chain of distribution.317 Those parties to the suit not in the chain of
distribution are not included in the reallocation.3 18 Thus, joint and
several liability is preserved only for parties in the chain of distribu-
tion, and the retailer in the hypothetical case would not be entitled to
an apportionment of fault.
New York's limitations of joint and several liability are similar to
those of Minnesota. Although New York limits the application of
joint and several liability to economic loss,319 its statute explicitly ex-
cludes from the apportionment any tortfeasor who is beyond the ju-
risdiction of the state.320 The relative fault of a manufacturer who
was beyond the reach of the court's jurisdiction would not be consid-
314. Compare HAW. S.B. No. S-86 § 17(2)(B)-(E) with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81
(West Supp. 1992).
315. See, e.g., HAW. S.B. No. S-86 § 17(2)(B)-(E).
316. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992).
317. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1992). The statute states in relevant part:
Subd. 2. Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is en-
tered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable
share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate
any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at
fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liabil-
ity is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing
liability to the claimant on the judgment.
Subd. 3. In the case of a claim arising from the manufacture, sale, use or
consumption of a product, and amount uncollectible from any person in the
chain of manufacture and distribution shall be reallocated among all other
persons in the chain of manufacture and distribution but not among the claim-
ant or others at fault who are not in the chain of manufacture or distribution
of the product. Provided, however, that a person whose fault is less than that
of a claimant is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment
which represents the percentage of fault attributable to the person whose
fault is less.
Id.
318. They would, however, be included in the reallocation if all of the parties in the
chain of distribution proved to be insolvent. Id
319. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
320. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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ered in determining the percentage of fault attributable to the re-
tailer.3 21 Therefore, the retailer would be jointly and severally liable
for the plaintiff's damages unless he could show that the court had
jurisdiction over the insolvent manufacturer.
The general rule in these states is that joint and several liability
was abrogated. Numerous exceptions to the general rule were then
articulated. The inclusion of these exceptions leads to the logical
conclusion that without such exceptions, abrogation of joint and sev-
eral liability would have applied. In other words, since the statutes
were not applied to stream of commerce cases in which the manufac-
turer is not present pursuant to legislative exclusions, absent those
exclusions, the statutes would presumably have applied. Proposition
51, on the other hand, is silent regarding the treatment of entities in
the chain of distribution.32 2 Therefore, since stream of commerce
cases in which the manufacturer is not present are not expressly ex-
cluded from its application, they should be presumed to be included.
In fact, Proposition 51 was recently interpreted to include all
tortfeasors who contributed to the injury when apportioning fault,
not just those who are within the jurisdiction of the court.3 23
Other states have statutes that operate similar to California's. The
comparable statute in Texas is quite complex.324 A claimant suing a
retailer for products liability grounded in negligence can only recover
if her percentage of responsibility is less than fifty percent.3 25 How-
ever, if the claimant is suing a retailer based on strict products liabil-
ity, then she can recover if her percentage of responsibility is less
than sixty percent.326 If the claimant's suit is not barred by the pre-
viously mentioned section, the court then reduces her recovery by
321. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1602 (10) (McKinney Supp. 1987). The Practice Com-
mentary for Rule 1602 (10) concludes that the ambiguity in this section makes it a
"mine field of potential problems." Id.
322. See supra note 1.
323. Mills v. MMM Carpets, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See supra
notes 277-90 and accompanying text.
324. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West Supp. 1992). The statute
reads in relevant part:
(a) In an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in personal in-
jury, property damage, or death or an action for products liability grounded in
negligence, a claimant may recover damages only if his percentage of responsi-
bility is less than or equal to 50 percent.
(b) In an action to recover damages for personal injury, property damage,
or death in which at least one defendant is found liable on the basis of strict
tort liability, strict products liability, or breach of warranty ... , a claimant
may recover damages only if his percentage of responsibility is less than 60
percent.
Id.
325. Id- at § 33.001(a).
326. Id. at § 33.001(b). No reason is provided for the distinction in the relevant
percentages.
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the percentage equal to her responsibility.27 A defendant is then lia-
ble to the claimant only for his percentage of responsibility deter-
mined by the trier of fact.328 However, if the defendant's
responsibility is greater than twenty percent,3 29 or if no responsibility
may be attributed to the claimant and the defendant's responsibility
is greater than ten percent, then the defendant is jointly and sever-
ally liable for the damages recoverable by the claimant.33 0 There-
fore, under the Texas statute, the trier of fact would determine
whether joint and several liability was abrogated in the hypothetical
scenario through its apportionment of fault. Thus, if the retailer
were found less than twenty percent responsible, or if the claimant
were found zero percent responsible and the retailer was found to be
less than ten percent responsible, then the retailer would be only
severally liable to the claimant.
Florida's statute abrogating joint and several liability33 ' applies
327. Id at § 33.012(a).
328. Id, at § 33.013. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a liable defendant is liable
to a claimant only for the percentage of the damages found by a trier of fact
equal to that defendant's percentage of responsibility with respect to the per-
sonal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which the damages
are allowed.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (a), each liable defendant is, in addition to
his liability under Subsection (a), jointly and severally liable for the damages
recoverable by the claimant under Section 33.012 with respect to a cause of
action if:
(1) the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater
than 20 percent ....
Ids
329. Id. at 33.013(b)(1).
330. Id at § 33.013(c)(1). For the damages that are recoverable, see Id at § 33.012.
331. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1992). The statute provides in relevant
part:
(3) Apportionment of damages.-In cases to which this section applies, the
court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such
party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and
several liability; provided that with respect to any party whose percentage of
fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter
judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on the basis of
the doctrine of joint and several liability.
(4) Applicability.-
(a) This section applies to negligence cases. For purposes of this section,
'negligence cases' includes, but is not limited to, civil actions for damages
based upon theories of negligence, strict liability, products liability, profes-
sional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of
warranty and like theories. In determining whether a case falls within the
term 'negligence cases,' the court shall look to the substance of the action and
not the conclusory terms used by the parties....
(5) Applicability of joint and several liability.-Notwithstanding the provi-
1539
only to negligence cases.3 3 2 However, for purposes of that section,
"negligence cases" include actions based on strict liability and prod-
ucts liability.333 The statute abrogates joint and several liability ex-
cept with regard to a particular defendant whose percentage of fault
exceeds the plaintiff's percentage of fault.33 4 In such a case, the de-
fendant is jointly and severally liable for only the plaintiff's eco-
nomic damages.33 5 Joint and several liability also still applies to all
actions in which the damages are less than $25,000.336 Therefore,
under the Florida statute, the trier of fact would also decide whether
the retailer was jointly and severally liable through its apportion-
ment of fault. Thus, if the retailer's percentage of fault were found
to be less than the plaintiff's and if the total damages were less than
$25,000, then the retailer would not be jointly and severally liable.
Even if the retailer were found to be more at fault than the plaintiff,
then joint and several liability would attach only to the plaintiff's
economic damages. Reliance on the statutes of other states is, there-
fore, inconclusive at best.
Proposition 51 has been in effect for more than six years. Thus, or-
dinarily one could argue that the legislature has had ample opportu-
nity to modify or clarify its breadth if they so intended. However,
since the initiative was enacted by the people, the state legislature
may be hesitant to constrict or expand the application of Proposition
51. Further, since the statute was interpreted to be nonretroactive,
many of the difficult borderline cases may not have reached the
courts of appeal yet, thereby leaving important issues unresolved.
Therefore, potential litigants and counsel have little guidance for in-
terpreting the statute, aside from its original language and underly-
ing policy concerns.
V. IMPACT
If Proposition 51 is found to apply to strict products liability cases
involving a retailer and an insolvent manufacturer, more questions
might be created than are answered. For example, a manufacturer
would then logically be entitled to apportion those damages caused
by a defective product between itself and the retailer even when it
sions of this section, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies to all ac-
tions in which the total amount of the damages does not exceed $25,000.
332. Id. at § 768.81(4)(a).
333. Id.
334. Id, at § 768.81(3).
335. Id. For a definition of economic damages under Florida law, see id at
§ 768.81(5).
336. Id. at § 768.81(5).
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was solvent.337 The effect of the initiative would then be exactly op-
posite of what was intended, financially burdening those who were
least responsible-the retailers. This, of course, presupposes that a
jury attributes some portion of fault to the retailer even when the
manufacturer is solvent-an unlikely result. On the other hand, jury
trials are at best unpredictable, and stranger things have
happened.338
A possible solution to the above problem would be for the retailer
to enter into an express indemnity contract with the manufacturers.
This, of course, assumes that the retailer has the requisite bargaining
power to demand such a contract from the manufacturer, which is
often not the case.3 39 Undoubtedly, such a process would also be pro-
hibitively expensive and time-consuming. Therefore, express con-
tractual indemnity would probably be unworkable.
Another potential concern would be the effect on other derivative
or vicarious liability situations. Particularly troublesome is the po-
tential impact on employer vicarious liability for tortious acts com-
mitted by an employee within the course and scope of employment.
The active tortfeasor in such a situation is the employee, while the
vicariously liable party is the employer. Allowing an apportionment
of fault under Proposition 51 in this situation could, and likely would,
substantially diminish the plaintiff's recovery. True, the plaintiff
would be able to recover all of her economic damages from the deep-
pocketed employer, but the amount of noneconomic damages would
be determined solely by the jury's apportionment of fault. At first
glance, this result may appear to be a harsh and unacceptable inter-
pretation of the statute, but is it? The purpose of the statute was to
substantially reduce the perceived inequities resulting from the appli-
cation of joint and several liability to defendants who are minimally
at fault.340 If Proposition 51 applies to the hypothetical retailer, then
the only rational conclusion based upon a faithful interpretation of
the statute would be that it should also apply to a vicariously liable
337. However, this would not fulfill the third prong of the proposed test because it
would not fulfill the policies underlying the statute.
338. In one case, the jury apportioned 10% of the fault for an auto accident to a
squirrel who crossed the road at an inopportune moment. Accordingly, the plaintiff's
recovery was reduced by 10%! See Sandra Calin, Multiple Tor(feasors: Proposition 51,
the "Fair Responsibility Act of 1986," 21 BEVERLY Hius BAR J. 26, 29 (Winter 1987).
339. "Absent an express indemnity agreement, a manufacturer is not obligated to
defend parties in its chain of distribution whenever the manufacturer is potentially lia-
ble for a defective product." Davis v. Air Tech. Indus., Inc., 582 P.2d 1010, 1013 n.6
(Cal. 1978).
340. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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employer. The liability of both is based only on their relationship
with the party actively at fault. The above analysis of the application
of joint and several liability,3 41 comparative fault principles, 2 and
the policy concerns underlying the adoption of Proposition 513
would likely apply, thereby allowing a vicariously liable employer to
pass the three-prong test and invoke the statute.3 4 The ultimate re-
sult would be more plaintiffs recovering less in damages from deep
pocket defendants who were minimally responsible for the damages,
thus reducing the ultimate financial burden on the consumer-pre-
cisely the articulated purpose of the statute.345
VI. CONCLUSION
It would be an understatement to say that California courts face a
difficult quandary when determining the extent of the application of
Proposition 51. The express language of the initiative enacted by the
citizens of California stands in direct contrast with years of common
law precedent. The Supreme Court of California has decided that
the statute passes constitutional muster. Therefore, it should be
faithfully applied to fulfill its goals.
The simple three-prong test proposed by this Comment can be eas-
ily applied to a given fact situation in order to ascertain the applica-
bility of Proposition 51. First, the court should determine whether
the action is one in which common law joint and several liability
would apply. Second, the court should determine whether the action
is one for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death based
upon principles of comparative fault. Third, the court should deter-
mine if the application would fulfill the policy concerns underlying
the statute's enactment. If all three prongs are satisfied, then the
court should vigorously apply the statute.
An application of this three-prong test to the hypothetical fact sce-
nario reveals that a retailer who is strictly liable in tort probably
should be allowed to have its fault apportioned under the statute
when the manufacturer of the product is insolvent. First, California
courts have explicitly stated that retailers are jointly and severally li-
able for the distribution of defective products. An application of the
policy concerns underlying joint and several liability further vali-
dates such a finding.
Second, whether the retailer's liability is derivative or direct, the
California Supreme Court strongly implies that principles of compar-
341. See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 92-290 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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ative fault apply to chain of distribution cases. A possible standard
by which to apportion fault can be developed by applying the factors
that serve as the basis for strict liability in tort. The first factor to
consider is the policy of accident prevention accomplished through
the reduction of defective products that reach the consumers. The
second factor that could be used is the policy of risk allocation. The
third and most challenging factor to apply is the difficulty of proof.
Practically speaking, however, BAJI 16.12 is better suited for pur-
poses of a jury trial, and should probably be applied instead of, or in
conjunction with, the strict liability factors.
Third, the dual policy concerns sought to be achieved through
Proposition 5:1 would be accomplished in applying the statute to
chain of distribution cases. A defendant (the retailer in this case)
would be held liable in closer proportion to his fault, thereby achiev-
ing a more equitable result. Furthermore, the consumer/taxpayer
would not bear the additional financial burden caused by joint and
several liability in the form of higher taxes and higher prices for con-
sumer goods.
Proposition 51, born only in 1986, is still in its infant stages. As the
passage of time brings more opportunities for challenges by litigants
and closer scrutiny by the courts, its broad and indefinite language
must inevitably be bounded by judicial decisions. If adopted, the
aforementioned test could serve to ease the growing pains of the stat-
ute, but by no means does it answer all questions or address all issues
created by Proposition 51 that are sure to arise in the near future.
JAMES A. GASH
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